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Current History

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Seven articles in this issue explore the stability and viability of major African states. Is American policy shifting in this area? Is Soviet and Cuban involvement growing? Our introductory article points out that "The administration's undertaking to recognize radical liberation movements that enjoyed widespread . . . African support was the price the United States paid for seeking to play the role of . . . intermediary in negotiating settlements that would forestall further Soviet and Cuban assistance."

American Foreign Policy in Africa

BY JON KRAUS

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PRESIDENT Jimmy Carter's policies in Africa suffered sustained criticism from conservative political forces in the United States. The architects of the administration's African policies were accused of failing to consider Africa in the context of United States-Soviet competition, and of suffering "a severe case of regionalitis." The administration was also criticized for failing to employ traditional instruments of power and force where United States interests were at stake, leading to a widespread perception of United States weakness.

The administration was also ridiculed when it maintained that Africa should or could be insulated from great power competition. The essence of United States strategy, critics argued, was precisely the containment of communism; they charged that the United States failure to counter communism in Angola encouraged the Soviet Union in Ethiopia and in Afghanistan. According to his critics, President Carter's policies in Rhodesia and in Namibia (South-West Africa) were helping to install radical Marxist governments whose leaders and policies would be profoundly inimical to American interests, establishing new footholds for Soviet power in Africa.[1]

The Carter administration's emphasis on human rights, it was argued, punished friendly authoritarian governments and downgraded weapons credits and sales abroad as basic instruments of diplomacy. Its emphasis on black majority rule in South Africa, critics maintained, substantially alienated a country of great strategic value to the West. Critics also argued that the weakness and vacillation of United States policy in Africa encouraged aggressive behavior by the Soviet Union, Cuba and other countries in Africa and elsewhere.

These criticisms were largely caricatures of the Carter administration's policies toward Africa, but they were articulated by those who will shape United States policies in Africa in the administration of President Ronald Reagan. Some criticisms came from the neoconservative wing of the Democratic party; United States activist foreign policies were also questioned by a post-Vietnam, post-Watergate, assertive and increasingly conservative Congress. All these criticisms stemmed from the bewilderment and sense of insecurity generated by two phenomena of the 1970's, which many mistakenly explained in terms of American weaknesses: the growing military, economic and logistical capacities of the Soviet Union as a global power; and the growing ability of third world countries to assert their interests and to mobilize support, internal and external, to frustrate the designs of large powers.

However, the criticisms were also a direct response to President Carter's policies toward Africa and the third world. The Carter administration had abandoned some assumptions and practices of the postwar orthodoxy of containment, with its explicit corollary of intervention to keep Marxists or leftists from power. President Carter was also reacting to the manipulative *realpolitik* of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. The Carter policies involved assumptions that were less moral than realistic: that the costs of United States intervention to frustrate political change were too high; that radical governments were usually estab-

[1]This perception of a total coincidence of interests and values between radical movements or governments and Soviet power advantages is an article of faith in United States foreign policy assumptions and has generated frequent United States interventions.

lished in response to internal conflicts and problems and that their economic and national interests were more important than their ideologies; that the United States and other Western countries would gain strategic advantages in working with these countries, given Western markets, technology and capital; that United States interests in certain areas, from export markets to access to vital raw materials, involved the need for more cooperative relationships; and that the United States image as an opponent of political and social change and a supporter of "friendly" authoritarian governments was detrimental to the interests of the United States and had corrosive political consequences for American institutions and behavior.

Central strands were apparent in the Carter administration's African policies, and there was essential agreement among the architects of these policies: President Carter himself; Cyrus Vance; Andrew Young, United Nations Ambassador; Anthony Lake, State Department Policy Planning director; and Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. There was an early, forthright and strong attempt to identify the United States as a supporter (however limited) of the most important foreign policy aspirations of the African states: majority rule in the remaining white-dominated regimes of southern Africa (Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia); the refusal to make Africa a battleground in United States-Soviet competition; and respect for Africa's established boundaries. President Carter and Andrew Young made substantial and successful efforts to persuade African leaders that the United States identified with African goals and problems, trying to reverse the antagonism and distrust felt by many African states because of Kissinger's total lack of interest or neglect and because of the United States Central Intelligence Agency's intervention in the Angolan civil war in tandem with South Africa.[2]

The Carter administration also anticipated and concentrated on key problems instead of being surprised or tilting toward the status quo in southern Africa, as Nixon and Kissinger did until they faced Soviet and Cuban intervention in 1975-1976.[3] Although events were not propitious for a settlement of the Rhodesian conflict until 1979, the administration sought consistently to develop negotiations that would end the conflict, resisting strong political pressures in the United States to recognize and aid a white-dominated "internal settlement" government, which would have aroused tremendous African antagonism. The United States also took the lead in forming a team of five Western countries that negotiated for three years to try to end the guerrilla war in Namibia between South Africa and the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO).

The administration also tried to deemphasize explicit cold war competition with the Soviet Union in Africa. (There were intermittent exceptions to this policy, after the Soviet-Cuban support for Ethiopia and the invasion of Shaba province from Angola in 1978.) The Carter administration was of course concerned with the tremendous growth of Soviet arms and military assistance and Cuban troops in Africa. Indeed, it was continually preoccupied with Soviet intervention and with preventing other conflicts from reaching a point where the Soviets and Cubans would be invited in, particularly in Zimbabwe. But the administration knew that most African states did not perceive the introduction of Soviet military advisers and arms and Cuban troops as a threat to African states. Soviet and Cuban entry into Angola was legitimized in African eyes because Angola was being attacked by South Africa. Soviet and Cuban troops entered Ethiopia at the request of a legitimate government that faced territorial disintegration in the wake of revolution and an invasion by the irredentist Somalis, who were laying claim to Ethiopia's Ogaden province. As Kenya's Foreign Minister observed:

> The Cubans have changed the history of Africa. On the question of racial subjugation in southern Africa, no one can convince me that the Azanians [South Africans], Zimbabweans and Namibians should not get assistance from elsewhere if they are denied assistance by the West.[4]

African countries have noted, however, that the United States has not been prepared to provide direct assistance to African liberation groups seeking to remove colonial and white minority rule in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, which systematically subjugate the Africans in political, economic, cultural and human terms.

At the same time, the Carter government did not try to oppose the rise of radical nationalist or Marxist governments or to mount discriminatory political and economic pressures against those which came to power, as in Angola and Mozambique. (It was not equally accommodating to radical change in Latin America, its own sphere of influence.) But despite substantial support for the recognition of Angola by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young, and the African bureau at the State Department, President Carter bowed to domestic pressure and to Zbigniew Brzezinski, refusing to recognize the Soviet-backed MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government in Angola unless Cuban troops were withdrawn.

[2]See Nathaniel Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir," *Foreign Affairs,* vol. 57, no. 1 (fall, 1978), pp. 109-124.

[3]See H. El-Khawas, ed., *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa* (NSSM 39) (Westport: Lawrence Hill, 1976).

[4]Quoted in Robert Price, *U.S. Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: National Interest and Global Strategy* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, no. 8), p. 38.

Continued UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) guerrilla resistance, occasional attacks from Zaire, and South African military raids on SWAPO guerrilla bases in southern Angola, have made the MPLA government too insecure to abandon Cuban support. Nonetheless, in many ways the United States officially supported openings to Angola, providing Export-Import Bank aid and encouraging United States foreign investment in exchange for Angola's cooperation in negotiations in Zimbabwe and Namibia. The administration was also willing to accept the Marxist political coloration of the nationalist movements in Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU) and Namibia (SWAPO), without manipulative efforts to promote more "moderate" alternatives (although the United States certainly preferred the less radical views of ZAPU [Zimbabwe African Peoples Union] and Joshua Nkomo in Zimbabwe). The administration was repeatedly criticized in Congress for supporting Marxist guerrillas (ZAPU and ZANU).Nevertheless, it became an intelligent American option to use economic pressures and negotiated settlements to avoid intensification of the conflicts.

The administration's undertaking to recognize radical liberation movements that enjoyed widespread internal and external African support was the price the United States paid for seeking to play the role of valuable intermediary in negotiating settlements that would forestall further Soviet and Cuban assistance. This recognition of the need to work with radical governments, of course, did not reduce traditional American advocacy of the private sector as the most reliable and productive engine of development and traditional promotion of United States foreign investment. The United States shows pronounced friendliness toward regimes that welcome American capital and trade, i.e., Nigeria, Zaire, Kenya and, increasingly, the Ivory Coast.

NONINTERVENTIONISM

Another strand of United States policy under President Carter was a pronounced reluctance to intervene with force, overtly or covertly, in the affairs of other states unless strategic United States security interests were at stake. This noninterventionist impulse was born in the Vietnam experience, nurtured in 1975-1976 in the inept CIA mission in Angola, and undergirded by congressional reluctance to permit new United States commitments in the post-Vietnam years.

Thus foreign policymakers under President Carter were generally opposed to the use of force and emphasized the virtues of diplomacy in Africa. Nonetheless, the expansion of Soviet and Cuban military assistance in Africa raised questions of intervention and assistance that deeply divided American policymakers, particularly with regard to the Cuban role in the 1978 invasion of Shaba province, Zaire, and the 1977-1978 Soviet-Cuban assistance to Ethiopia. The questions involved the nature of the Soviet-Cuban interventions, their "global" or strategic significance, and what action if any the United States should take.

When the ex-Katanga gendarmes who had fled Zaire for Angola in the mid-1960's invaded Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba province in March, 1977, the Carter administration found no evidence of Cuban instigation or support. However, a second Katangese invasion of Shaba province in May, 1978, led to strong and insistent American denunciation of Cuban-Soviet intervention. Although the administration at first insisted it had evidence of Cuban support (evidence that did not convince Congress or the State Department), the real reason for the administration's alarm was growing Soviet-Cuban involvement in Africa; 1,000 Soviet military advisers and heavy equipment and roughly 16,000 Cuban troops arrived in Ethiopia in early 1978, and small-scale Cuban military assistance was extended to a number of other African states. However, the administration's concern had its origin less in Africa than in superpower competition and in non-African events like Soviet agitation against the neutron bomb in Europe, the pro-Communist coup in Afghanistan in April, 1978, and President Carter's sharp decline in popularity.

The United States had become increasingly alienated from the revolutionary military regime in Ethiopia, as it became more radical and as Mengistu Haile Mariam ruthlessly eliminated his military and civilian competitors in a manner that raised a human rights issue. Because the United States was reluctant to continue its traditional role of arms supplier to Ethiopia, Ethiopia accepted Soviet military aid instead and cut military ties with the United States. During the period, the Soviet Union and Cuba sought repeatedly to mediate Somalia's dispute with Ethiopia, which stemmed from Somalia's irredentist campaign for Ogaden province.

Although the United States resisted Somalia's request for arms aid to oppose Ethiopia's military strength on the grounds that this would embroil the United States in Somalia's continuing attacks on Ethiopian forces in Ogaden province, the United States joined Saudia Arabia and Egypt in trying to wean Somalia from its Soviet ties.

After thousands of Somali-backed irregulars of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) invaded Ethiopia in May, 1977, the United States offered Somalia "defensive weapons," an offer repeated by Secretary Vance after 40,000 Somali army regulars joined in the invasion of Ethiopia. The United States subsequently withdrew its arms aid offer in response to the objections of other African states. There was no

African support for Somalia's attempt to change the established borders. Only after Somalia broke relations with the Soviet Union and Cuba in November, 1977, in an apparent bid for Western military support, did the Soviet Union and Cuba provide enormous military assistance to Ethiopia.[5]

The second invasion of Zaire's Shaba province prompted shrill United States accusations that Cuba was helping to destabilize Zaire and posed anew the question of the survival of the pro-American Mobutu regime in Zaire.* The possibility of a new CIA mission in Angola was raised and blocked. But within six weeks, the United States opted for a highly successful diplomatic alternative to lessen Zaire's insecurity. Donald McHenry, United States Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations, mediated a settlement between Zaire and Angola and persuaded Angolan President Agostinho Neto to intervene with SWAPO leaders to persuade them to accept a United Nations and United States-European plan for a negotiated settlement of the war in Namibia, which would also reduce Angola's liability to South African attacks.

The United States supported the Mobutu regime in Zaire in response to the second Shaba invasion; thus many Zairians felt that the United States was responsible for the survival of the repressive Mobutu regime.[6] The United States subsequently accepted the French concept of a "Pan-African collective security force" to aid Mobutu and repel the Katangese attack. French and Belgian paratroopers were flown to Shaba province by American aircraft, followed by Moroccan and a few Senegalese troops. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, among other African leaders, denounced a "Pan-African security force" planned and manned by Europeans and Americans. The State Department understood that the United States was supporting a leader who had lost popular and elite support. Subsequent American attempts to maintain or increase military and economic assistance to the Mobutu regime met with increasing resistance in Congress, as evidence of the regime's corruption, incompetence and disinterest in reform was repeatedly manifest.

The United States has also stressed the mediation of conflicts through the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to prevent the escalation of inter-African conflicts. Thus the United States refused Morocco's requests for military credits to fight the Algerian and Libyan-supported Polisario in the Western Sahara, believing that American aid would reduce Moroccan King Hassan's interest in a negotiated settlement. This policy of arms restraint was sharply challenged in the administration and in Congress in 1979-1980.

The United States had been a relatively small arms supplier to Africa during 1974-1978, providing $440 million, or 3.7 percent of the total arms flow; the Soviet Union provided 56.5 percent, and France, Germany and Italy all sold more arms to Africa than the United States. In 1979-1980, however, there were some reversals in United States policies.

AFRICAN POLICY SHIFTS

Events largely external to Africa imparted a new thrust to President Carter's foreign policy posture in 1979-1980. The overthrow of the Shah of Iran, the seizure of United States hostages in Teheran, the purported Cuban-Soviet involvement in the 1979 North Yemen-South Yemen border war, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979 (which escalated United States fears of a Soviet threat to Persian Gulf oil), all contributed to a new emphasis on strategic military considerations in United States foreign policy. The Senate's skeptical consideration of the SALT II treaty and President Carter's flagging domestic popularity fed this trend. A pervasive and insistent cold war climate enveloped United States foreign policy and military spending decisions. A decision was made to develop a permanent United States naval presence in the Indian Ocean and a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF); these suggested the desirability of naval facilities in the Indian Ocean.

This strategic thinking revived United States interest in Indian Ocean bases in Kenya (Mombasa) and Somalia (Berbera), destroyed congressional resistance to arms credits for Morocco, and sharpened a preference for supporting friendly states. Regional power conflicts played a more important role; states who shared interests with the United States—Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Sudan—all supported military aid to Morocco and Somalia because of their competition with radical states in North Africa and the Middle East.

In early 1980 the United States announced its

(*Continued on page 129*)

*Zaire's leaders are wholly corrupt and repressive, its living standards have been in sharp decline for years, and it is deeply indebted to Western bankers, whom it could not repay if Shaba's minerals ceased to flow.

[5]William LeoGrande, *Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980* (Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1980), pp. 35-39.

[6]See Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, "Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal 1981 (Part 7)," pp. 562-566.

Jon Kraus has frequently undertaken research in West Africa. His most recent publications include "The Political Economy of Industrial Relations in Ghana," in Ukandi Dimachi and Lester Trachtman, eds., *Industrial Relations in Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1979) and "Strikes and Labor Power in a Post-Colonial African State," *Development and Change* (London), April, 1979.

"The presumption of Liberia's leaders is that they constitute the vanguard of a reform revolution. . . . Yet it is not clear whether the coup of April 12 was a dramatic first step in a revolution that will have far-reaching . . . consequences or whether it will be regarded in the future as a major event in which old patterns of behavior were interrupted but not destroyed . . . ."

The Liberian Coup in Perspective

BY J. GUS LIEBENOW

Professor of Political Science, Indiana University

THE Liberian coup of April 12, 1980, has had significance far out of proportion to the size of that West African state's population (1.5 million) or territory (roughly equivalent to the state of Ohio). For Africa, the assassination of President William R. Tolbert by a small detachment of soldiers under the command of Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe was the first instance in which a presiding head of the Organization of African Unity had been deposed, let alone killed. As OAU president, Tolbert had achieved a high measure of popularity among his fellow heads of state; thus the reaction to the Doe regime was both personally and politically motivated.

For the Western democracies the significance of the coup lay in the fact that Liberia is the only state in Africa that has had in-depth—albeit intermittent—ties with the United States. Those ties, which have been political, military, economic and cultural date from the alien founding of the Liberian political community in 1821.[1] It was the intention of the prominent white Americans who created the American Colonization Society in 1816 that Liberia should serve as a refuge for freed persons of color from America as well as a place to deposit Africans taken from ships intercepted on the high seas by the United States Navy after the suppression of the slave trade. Against a background of almost 160 years of United States support, the prospects of a new military government seeking to diversify its range of foreign policy options radically challenged the dominant position of the United States and its allies in Liberia.

In terms of Africana scholarship, moreover, the coup had several ramifications. The April 12 action terminated the rule of Africa's oldest extant political party. The True Whig party had governed Liberia without an effective opposition since the election of 1877. Now Liberia has joined the ranks of newly independent African states in which civilian regimes have been displaced by one form or another of military rule. Of even greater practical and theoretical significance, the April coup has revealed the nature of the internal relationship between the ruling minority and the tribal majority. At the core of the ruling minority, which comprised little more than five percent of the total, were the Americo-Liberians, citizens who could putatively trace their ancestry in part to the overseas founding of Liberia. The overwhelming tribal majority, on the other hand, consisted of individuals who were still partially rooted in the culture and society of one of the 16 tribal groups identified in the recent Liberian census.

The international status of Liberia as an independent republic and a member both of the League of Nations and the United Nations masked a domestic situation which, for all practical purposes, was colonial. In this respect there are parallels between Liberia and the relationship in South Africa between whites and non-whites or in the Ethiopian Empire between Amharic and non-Amharic speakers. This perception of the relationship as colonial was reflected in comments I frequently heard this summer in Liberia, when tribal people suggested that "1980 is the first year of Liberian independence." Indeed, since the 17 enlisted men who carried out the coup and who constitute the membership of the ruling People's Redemption Council are drawn exclusively from tribal ranks, it is easy to appreciate this perception.

Although events in the 12 months preceding the April, 1980, coup made it possible for many local participants to anticipate momentous changes, most foreign observers—including American diplomats—were caught unprepared either for the coup itself or for the swiftness with which a handful of relatively uneducated and inexperienced enlisted men could bring the True Whig regime so conclusively to its demise. Equally surprising, there has not been even the semblance of organized resistance to the coup, despite the persistence of rumors. Finally, the external world seemed totally unprepared for the depth of tribal animosity, which was manifest in the public humiliation of members of the deposed regime and their wives and which culminated in the televised execution on April 22 of 13 former officials on the ocean beach behind Barclay Training Center.

And yet, the seeds of interethnic violence were

[1]For elaboration on the pre-Tolbert political system, see J. Gus Liebenow, *Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969).

evident almost from the beginning of the contact between the settlers and the indigenous inhabitants. The initial misunderstanding evolved from the fact that the concept of "sale" of land had no meaning in a society where land was distributed communally on the basis of usufructuary right of occupancy rather than individual private freehold. Hence, conflict became an implicit element in the relationship from the moment that Lieutenant—later Commodore—Matthew Perry negotiated the first acquisition of land at Cape Mesurado in behalf of the American Colonization Society. Hostility intensified as the settlers pressed tribal residents into service as field hands and household domestics and imposed American forms of speech, justice and commerce in the area under their control. As the ACS and the settlers extended their control over tribal land—often at gunpoint—it was often only the timely intervention of American, British and other naval forces that prevented the colonists from being thrown back into the sea.

Even before 1847, when the settlers took the bold step of declaring Liberia's independence, they had emulated the competing European colonial powers, extending their control of the interior by outright conquest, by claiming territory on the basis of "journeys of discovery," and by converting limited treaties of commerce and friendship into generalized claims to the territory and inhabitants involved. Indeed, with respect to the Kru, Gola, Grebo and other groups, the Americo-Liberians resorted to arms to reassert their claims in the face of stiff resistance, which occasionally persisted into the present century. Parallel to tribal resistances, the Liberians had to withstand the competing military and diplomatic claims of the British and French to the same territory.

During the nineteenth century, the Americo-Liberians developed a complex strategy to deal with the dual threat of tribal resistance and European colonial competition. The first element in the strategy was an effort to insulate the tribal hinterland against European intervention. Even though this isolation delayed the economic development of the country's resources, the Liberian government restricted legitimate trade to a few coastal ports, refused to permit Christian missionaries to establish churches and schools in the interior, and prohibited the travel of foreigners who might instigate hostility against the Americo-Liberians or lend credence to European colonial claims.

Second—and this is partly a product of the limited resources available to the settlers—the government attempted to impose ethnic boundaries as a method of disengaging tribal groups from each other. Borrowing a leaf from British colonial rule, the settlers pursued a policy of indirect rule, which not only co-opted tribal chiefs and other leaders (like the heads of the poro secret societies) into the national administration, but gave the tribal leaders the latitude to pursue traditional goals in a traditional manner.[2] In return, the Liberian government expected the chiefs to collect the hut taxes, recruit soldiers for the frontier force, and maintain order.

Ultimately, however, the control strategy forced the leadership to recognize that the greatest threat to Americo-Liberian supremacy in the expanded colonial state could come from divisions in the ranks of the dominant group itself. Social and political divisions had appeared early, based upon differences in wealth, gradations in skin pigmentation, whether the settler had come from the New World or had been liberated from a slave ship, and whether one's ancestry included people of tribal background. Division in the ranks could be exploited by tribal leaders, and disaffected settlers might establish political coalitions with tribal leaders.

METHODS OF CONTROL

The mechanisms for preventing or regularizing dissent were devised by chance as well as by conscious planning. With respect to political activity, representation and suffrage were restricted to male property owners in the five coastal counties, and after the election of 1877 opposition to the True Whig party was either token or nonexistent. The economic mechanisms only became apparent at the end of the nineteenth century, as the once-prosperous Americo-Liberian merchant and shipping class saw its fortunes wither as a consequence of global depressions and the failure of their frigates to compete with steam-propelled European freighters.[3]

Thereafter, the settler ruling class devoted itself to careers in politics, the law and the ministry. Aside from petty trading, any significant involvement of this class in economic affairs came as a consequence of the influence and access that rewarded those holding political office. Independent Liberian entrepreneurs who might create client or other relationships with tribal traders or cultivators were overtly discouraged.

The capstone of the control strategy, however, was the maintenance of social solidarity among the core leaders, who considered themselves descendants of the founders of Liberia. Through an elaborate system of marriage, divorce and remarriage, the leading families and their heirs had created a fairly tight network of relationships. These families monopolized most of the significant government posts as well as the economic and other perquisites that emerged in a society at a low stage of development. Changes in political office

[2]For discussion of the system of tribal administration among the Gola, see Warren L. d'Azevedo, "A Tribal Reaction to Nationalism (part I)," *Liberian Studies Journal,* vol. 1 (Spring, 1969), pp. 1-21, and subsequent issues.

[3]Dwight N. Syfert, "The Origins of Privilege: Liberian Merchants, 1822-1847," *Liberian Studies Journal,* vol. 6 (1975), pp. 109-128.

reflected a rise or fall in the political fortunes of key patrons, and marriage and divorce were frequently undertaken with an eye to advancing one's political, social, and economic standing.

The system was not watertight. A few enterprising tribal youths could advance if they were adopted as "wards" of settler patrons. In many instances they were "presented" with Americo-Liberian spouses. Paralleling the family network was the social control exercised through participation and office-holding in the leading Protestant churches and, in particular, the quasi-religious, quasi-political organization, the Masonic Order. The Masonic lodges served as the settler equivalent of the tribal poro societies.

THE TUBMAN ERA

Modifications in the control strategy occurred during the last quarter of the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth centuries. Early in the twentieth century, resistance on the part of the Kru led the Liberian leadership to call on American and other foreigners for financial support and for help in reorganizing the military and the hinterland bureaucracy. The need for government revenue, moreover, compelled the government in 1926 to sign an agreement with the American Firestone Company to develop the faltering rubber industry. And the League of Nations inquiry of the 1930's into the charges of abusive labor practices forced the government to introduce drastic reforms in its interior policies and programs.[4]

The election of William V.S. Tubman as President in 1943, however, signaled the beginning of a new era in Liberia, in terms of its future role in continental politics and in the relationship between the Americo-Liberian elite and the tribal masses. The change in domestic strategies was made possible in part by the discovery of extensive deposits of high-grade iron ore that would supplement Liberia's dependence on rubber, which was subject to gross price fluctuations on the world market (particularly with the advent of synthetic rubber). Although there were risks that the increased involvement of tribal people in the cash and wage economy could lead to demands for political participation, Tubman chose to take the risks. Under his open door policy, foreign investment and trading relationships were vigorously pursued on terms that appeared to be mutually beneficial. Ultimately the open door policy would diminish Liberia's inordinate dependence upon the United States, and the exploitation of timber and a variety of tropical crops would lessen the impact of global pricing mechanisms.[5]

For the tribal inhabitants, the economic consequences of the open door policy were considerable. Involvement in the cash economy made it possible for them to improve housing conditions, purchase manufactured goods instead of relying on craft production, and accumulate school fees for the education of their children. Increased government revenues led to the construction of schools and clinics in the interior and other benefits. Despite the improvements, however, the Americo-Liberians in the coastal counties reaped a disproportionate share of the fruits of the new prosperity.

Moreover, development proved to be a double-edged sword for the tribal people. The network of new roads, for example, facilitated the flow of goods to the interior and the flow of labor to wage opportunities in the mines and the cities. The new roads, however, also meant greater efficiency in the collection of taxes and the recruitment of soldiers and laborers under less than voluntary terms. Improved transport, plus the weakening of tribal cohesion, moreover, made it easier for the Americo-Liberian elite to begin the systematic acquisition of land that had previously been reserved for the tribal people. It is estimated that the nominal purchase or outright theft of land in Liberia under both Tubman and his successor, Tolbert, constituted one of the major "land grabs" in African history, comparable to the land seizure by white settlers in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya during the colonial era.

The political and cultural complement to the open door policy was Tubman's unification program, which was designed to reduce or eliminate the legal and other distinctions between tribal and settler descendants. Its most positive contributions were psychological. Tribal Liberians could at last take pride in their cultural identities, could resume the use of tribal names, could wear traditional dress in public, and could openly acknowledge conversion to Islam. The expanding educational system of the Tubman years permitted people of tribal background to occupy posts in the bureaucracy once monopolized by Americo-Liberians. Educated tribal youths were, in increasing numbers, employed by Monrovia-based law firms to run their new branch offices in the interior. New political offices, moreover, were being created as the county system of government was extended into the interior.

It was, however, another example of "the more things change, the more they remain the same." Parallel to the extension to the tribal hinterland of suffrage and representation in the legislature, real power gravitated even more effectively to the President and to those influential Americo-Liberians who surround him. Although education provided more

[4]Ibrahim K. Sundiata, *Black Scandal: America and the Liberian Labor Crises, 1929-1936* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1980).

[5]Cf. Robert W. Clower, George Dalton, Mitchell Harwitz, and A. A. Walters, *Growth without Development: An Economic Survey of Liberia* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

bureaucratic jobs for tribal youth and lower income Americo-Liberians, the really significant executive, legislative, judicial, and ambassadorial positions were retained by the leading families at the core of the Americo-Liberian elite.

New employment opportunities in the private sector also increased dramatically under the Tubman programs. The Americo-Liberian leaders, however, preferred to leave it to Americans, Europeans, Lebanese and other non-blacks to provide the main sources of capital and entreprenurial talent. Since the constitution prevented non-blacks from becoming citizens, the foreign entrepreneurs existed on sufferance and could be deported if they became a factor in local politics. Rather than being directly involved in private business, Americo-Liberian officials "poached on the periphery." That is, either they served on the boards of foreign corporations that had concession agreements with the government, and thereby had access to salaries, trips abroad, and scholarships for their children; or the politicians used their positions to acquire businesses, rubber plantations, and other enterprises that were managed by Nigerians, West Indians, or other foreigners. Thus, there was no divorce between political and economic power in Tubman's Liberia.

THE TOLBERT SUCCESSION

Even the modicum of genuine reform was threatened in 1971 when Tubman died in an English hospital after 28 years in office. His legal successor, William R. Tolbert, was closely identified with the core of the Whig elite in terms of ancestry, dress, and manner of speech, his service as president of the Baptist World Alliance, and the manner in which his brothers had blatantly used their political offices to advance their private fortunes and their control of vital sectors of the new economy. To the surprise of most observers, however, Tolbert not only survived "the succession crisis," but went on to outperform Tubman in terms of the informality of his attire, his visibility in even the remotest reaches of the republic, his programs for expanding the road network and the educational and health facilities throughout the country, and in attracting new sources of foreign aid, trade and investment to Liberia.

Tolbert went even further than Tubman in attacking some of the odious symbols of caste and class differences, like the wording of the national crest—"The Love of Liberty Brought Us Here"—which was obviously offensive to the majority whose ancestors had never left the country. Tolbert also broadened Liberia's world and continental role by taking direct action in the Biafran war, by assuming an activist role in the campaign against South African apartheid, and by serving as president of the Organization of African Unity.

As Tolbert's foreign stock rose, however, his domestic base became untenable, because of the unbridled greed and corruption of the Americo-Liberian class and the centrality of his own immediate family in the mounting system of avarice. Tubman had carefully avoided having his family so personally conspicuous. In contrast, the splendor of the Tolbert family compounds at the newly refurbished and landscaped ancestral village of Bensonville (renamed Bentol) mocked the creeping squalor of the slums of Monrovia in a manner reminiscent of Marie Antoinette. Almost daily, moreover, the gap was growing between the high expectations of tribal and poorer Americo-Liberians (who had received higher education abroad) and the bitter reality of their failure to get the jobs and perquisites commensurate with those available to their Americo-Liberian peers. Ultimately, the expanding government and business bureacracies depended on the tribal and poorer Americo-Liberians if the "development miracle" were to continue.

In the final analysis, however, a cluster of economic and political factors led not only to the coup of April 12 but to its widespread popular acceptance as inevitable and desirable.[6] The ostentatious living of the Americo-Liberian elite was revealed in Tolbert's own government reports, which indicated that four percent of the population owned more than 60 percent of the wealth. Public waste in behalf of Whig vanity was epitomized in the construction of the lavish hotel-chalets complex for the 1979 OAU meeting in Monrovia. That and other outlays for the conferees cost the Liberian government over $200 million.

At the same time, the rate of urban unemployment was spiraling as rural cultivators were deprived of their land or as the low prices paid by government purchasers for their crops compelled them to migrate to secure funds to pay their taxes and meet other needs. The rural exodus also resulted in a major food shortage, which could only be overcome by importing rice and other foodstuffs. That, in turn, further aggravated a mounting balance of payments problem. The action, however, that spelled the demise of the Tolbert regime was the government's decision in April, 1979, to impose a 50 percent increase in the price of rice for the urban consumer. The demonstrations and riots in response to this move left in their wake somewhere between 40 and 140 dead and an additional 400 wounded—the victims of a nervous Monrovia police force that had panicked. In the ensuing rioting, looting and general chaos, the Tolbert regime survived only because President Sekou Touré of Guinea answered Tolbert's appeal and sent Guinean MIG aircraft and a contingent of troops to restore order.

The political aspects of the collapsing Whig system

[6]Cf. my forthcoming three-part series on Liberia in the American Universities Field Staff *Reports,* December, 1980.

also came into sharper focus during the April 14, 1979, rice riots. Even before that date, general dissatisfaction had greeted Tolbert's efforts to placate various contending forces simultaneously. On the one hand, Tolbert was mindful of the legitimate demands of younger Liberians, both tribal and Americo-Liberian, for more significant participation in the aging True Whig party. Tolbert's international image, moreover, required that he give these aspirations serious attention. On the other hand, his main base of support, the Whig gerontocracy, was alarmed by the rapid pace of change and insisted that Tolbert deal harshly and convincingly with dissent, advocating the legalization of the single party state. Tolbert's "sincerity of the moment" created an impression of weakness and vacillation. Concessions to reformists one day would be withdrawn the next day in a stemwinding speech intended to arouse the flagging spirits of the party faithful.

After the rice riots of 1979, Tolbert could no longer gloss over the demands for reform. After all, one of the two groups of young reformers, the Progressive Alliance of Liberians (PAL), had organized the demonstration in defiance of a hastily arranged government ban. PAL, like its counterpart, the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA), had been organized by Liberians who had studied in the United States. From the time of its organization in 1975 by Gabriel Baccus Matthews (the current Foreign Minister in the Doe government), PAL had developed a program of pragmatic African socialism that echoed that of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. PAL's appeal to its coalition of students, urban unemployed and small cultivators was its call for greater distributive justice through reform of the existing foreign concession agreements and changes in the political system. Although PAL was adamant in its opposition to the caste and class systems, its strategy for reform was a combination of open confrontation and peaceful challenge to the Whig party through the ballot.

The rice riots had energized the PAL leadership, and its ranks increased as Tolbert vacillated. In keeping with other African liberation movements, PAL's leaders profited by their arrest and imprisonment after the riots. Faced with the prospect of having political dissidents in jail at the time of the June, 1979, OAU meeting, however, Tolbert and Matthews engaged in a chess game, which ultimately produced a letter of abject apology from Matthews and the release of the dissenters. After the OAU meeting, PAL declared its intention to register as a legal opposition party, the People's Progressive party (PPP). Rather than flatly rejecting the idea, Tolbert appeared to give the move tacit support, but subsequently permitted a lower court judge to pose legal barriers to PPP's registration and participation in the November mayoralty elections and the 1983 presidential campaign. In the face of threatened demonstrations by the PPP, in January, 1980, Tolbert relented and recognized PPP as a legal party. Emboldened by their victory, on March 7 Matthews and his cohorts decided to demonstrate at the gates of the executive mansion, demanding Tolbert's immediate resignation. Predictably, Tolbert was enraged by this affront. He arrested 38 PPP leaders and other dissenters and began to consider the establishment of Liberia as a single party state.

The guiding force behind MOJA, the second dissent group, was a group of students and professors at the University of Liberia, including Togba-Nah Tipoteh (now Minister for Planning and Economic Affairs), H. Boima Fahnbulleh (currently Minister of Education), and Dean Amos Sawyer. MOJA wanted a more dramatic restructuring of Liberian society and more deliberate redefinition of Liberian national culture in order to overcome caste, class and tribal differences. Assuming a continental mission, it urged more vigorous assault on apartheid and injustice everywhere. Within Liberia, it had a positive program for creating worker and cultivator cooperatives, which would work for economic improvement and would be vehicles for disseminating public health and other development information among the rural and urban masses. MOJA resorted to the courts, to the work place, and to every other forum where it could press its case for reform. Although initially MOJA leaders eschewed party politics, they decided to assault Whig corruption and abuse of public trust frontally by fielding an independent candidate in the November, 1979, mayoralty race in Monrovia. The popularity of MOJA's candidate, Amos Sawyer, was immediately evident and seriously unnerved the Whig leadership. Again, in an action that revealed its basic insecurity, the government postponed the elections until June, 1980.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE MILITARY: THE APRIL 12 COUP

Despite the general phenomenon of military rule in most of Africa, the Liberian military had not historically served as a threat to the civilian Whig regime. Even the arrest of army officers on charges of "plotting" during the Tubman and Tolbert eras were viewed as isolated aberrations. The officer class, in

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" . . . as a former white settler colony that suffered the bitter Mau Mau war between 1952 and 1957, Kenya has been amazingly free of large-scale violence. One has only to glance at the traumatic experiences of its Ethiopian, Somali and Ugandan neighbors, as well as the racial strife on the island of Zanzibar that preceded Zanzibar's nominal union with the Tanzanian mainland. . . ."

Kenya: Africa's Odd Man In

BY AARON SEGAL

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IN the militant rhetoric that characterizes much of East African politics, Kenya would seem to be the odd country out, castigated by its critics for its de facto military alliance with the United States, its dependence on Western aid and private investment, the important rôle played in its economy by multinational corporations and local businessmen of Asian origin, and its "trickle down" economic policies that are alleged to have enriched a few Africans at the expense of the many.[1]

Yet Kenya is really the odd country in; its achievements since independence in 1963 compare favorably with those of its neighbors and with most African states. Kenya is one of the few African states without oil or minerals that maintains a modest but steady rate of economic progress. Although there is a visible class of "Wa-Benzi," the Swahili term for owners of Mercedes-Benz luxury cars—mostly politicians, businessmen and senior civil servants—there is also a growing class of prosperous rural farmers planting hybrid maize and other cash crops, introducing agricultural innovations (often financed with savings remitted by their urban relatives), sending their children, including more and more girls, on to secondary schools, and taking an active interest in their society.[2]

Most important, since 1963 Kenya has enjoyed relative political stability; in 1978 it succeeded in managing a peaceful civilian succession of power on the death of President and nationalist hero Jomo Kenyatta. Kenya is a de facto one-party state, but its major English and Swahili language newspapers remain privately owned and mildly critical of the government. During the November, 1979, parliamentary elections, the fifth since independence, most seats were contested by several candidates from the single party Kenya African National Union (KANU), and voters expressed their discontent by defeating seven Cabinet ministers and other prominent figures.[3] On taking power, President Daniel Arap Moi, Vice President under Kenyatta since 1965, declared a broad amnesty and released a small but visible group of political prisoners, including veteran opposition leader Oginga Odinga and the talented and radical novelist and university lecturer Ngugi wa Thiono. Kenya is no democracy, but the rule of law by and large prevails, the judiciary is relatively independent, the press is softly muzzled, strikes and political demonstrations are allowed if discouraged, the government radio and television are not completely propagandistic, and the military is quiescent.

Kenya is one of the few African states that have not experienced a coup or a serious military coup attempt since independence (several contingents of Kenyan forces mutinied in 1964 and were disarmed by British troops at the request of the Kenya government).[4] In spite of its fragile ethnic and racial balance, Kenya has experienced no massive political unrest. Its political scene has been tarnished by the assassination of several important political figures, especially Finance Minister Tom Mboya in 1969 and articulate critic Joseph Kariuki in 1974.

However, as a former white settler colony that suffered the bitter Mau Mau war between 1952 and 1957, Kenya has been amazingly free of large-scale violence. One has only to glance at the traumatic experiences of its Ethiopian, Somalian and Ugandan neighbors, as well as the racial strife on the island of Zanzibar that preceded its nominal union with the Tanzanian mainland, to realize that Kenya is truly the odd man in. Whatever has saved Kenya from the ordeals of its neighbors—whether it is the "political economy of neocolonialism" cited by its critics, or the deft moderate leadership of Kenyatta and Moi, or other factors—Kenya, together with the Ivory Coast and a few other states, has become an African bastion of capitalism, Western alignment, and civilian conciliatory rule.

It is no accident that the East African Community

[1]Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neocolonialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

[2]Paul Collier, and Deepak Lal, *Poverty and Growth in Kenya* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Staff Working Paper 389, May, 1980).

[3]Vincent B. Khapoya, "Kenya under Moi: Continuity or Change?" *Africa Today,* vol. 27, no. 1 (1980), pp. 17-32.

[4]Colin Legum, ed., *Africa Research Bulletin 1978-1979,* pp. B-266-270. An account is given here of an abortive coup at the time of the presidential succession.

which once ran common airways, railways, posts and telecommunications and other services for the three East African governments (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda) has fallen apart and that since 1978 the Kenyan-Tanzanian border has been firmly closed. (See Cover 3 map of Africa). Depending on one's views, Kenya is either the rotten fruit in the socialist East African basket or the living proof that African socialism as exemplified by Tanzania does not work.

Kenya's apparent stability stands out against the unrest and violence that engulf most of its neighbors. Seeking to unite all the Somali-speaking peoples under a single flag, the Somali government pursues irredentist claims against Ethiopia and Kenya. The Ethiopian-Somali war of 1978 and continued guerrilla fighting in the disputed Ogaden area have brought one and one-half million refugees to Somalia, nearly 20 percent of its total population. Although the long and desolate Kenya-Somalia border remains quiet, there are still occasional "shifta" (guerrilla) raids, and Kenya's Somali-speaking population listens wistfully to broadcasts from Mogadishu. Kenya needs a substantial military commitment and a mobile force capable of fighting in remote arid areas lest it lose its Northeast Province, one-third of all Kenya with five percent of the total population and few resources.

Although Ethiopia should be Kenya's natural ally against Somali claims, it has instead become a Marxist socialist military state with Cuban troops, Soviet advisers, and a major military machine.[5] The desolate Ethiopian-Kenyan border area, subject to frequent cattle-raiders and smugglers, is also a crossing point for Ethiopian refugees fleeing a police state, and several thousand Ethiopians have taken refuge in Kenya. Finally, the recently improved Addis Ababa-Nairobi highway has the potential for being a major commercial artery but is plagued by bandits, guerrillas, poor maintenance and high transport costs. Thus Kenya maintains polite but formal relations with the Ethiopian revolutionary government that came to power by deposing Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, while viewing its internal policies and external rhetoric with considerable anxiety.

Kenya and the Sudan share only a narrow border strip and enjoy close and cordial relations. Economic chaos and insecurity in Uganda have resulted in a major road improvement that links Nairobi directly with the Nile River town of Juba, capital of the Southern Sudan Region. At considerable cost, this lifeline permits much of the Southern Sudan to trade with the outside world without transiting Uganda or relying on the often closed all-Sudanese river and rail routes to Port Sudan. As political moderates and potential peacemakers on several African issues, Kenya and the Sudan cooperate in the Organization of African Unity and other forums. Yet the Sudan's swelling refugee population (from Ethiopia, Chad and Uganda) and its own fragile internal balance after years of civil war between northern Arabs and southern Africans make the Kenyans cautious about closer ties.

Landlocked Uganda on the shores of Lake Victoria should be Kenya's natural trading partner for goods and services in transit and for the consumer goods produced by Kenyan factories. Drifting into political violence and economic stagnation since independence, Uganda experienced a horrifying nightmare under the rule of President Idi Amin (1971-1977). Kenyans were sympathetic, horrified witnesses, providing shelter for 50,000 or more Ugandan refugees. Amin's ouster of the Ugandan Asian community of nearly 100,000 persons by fiat in 1972 was a particularly traumatic event for Kenyan Asians and a direct affront to President Kenyatta's national slogan of "Harambee" (let us pull together). While increasing its police and military surveillance of the once open Kenyan-Ugandan border and occasionally seeking to limit massive smuggling when the Ugandan currency became worthless and few goods were available in Uganda, the Kenyan government edged away from direct involvement in the Ugandan horror. Amin frequently blustered that his inflated army could take on the much weaker Kenyan forces but expressed his respect for "Mzee," elder President Kenyatta. Several hundred thousand Kenyans long resident in Uganda, especially as sugar estate workers, were brutally expelled to western Kenya or returned home after losing their jobs. Kenyan-Ugandan trade slumped, but the railway and highway became even more important as Uganda's sole lifeline after hostilities broke out between Uganda and Tanzania.

The overthrow of Amin in 1979 by Tanzanian soldiers and Ugandan opposition forces, the failure of several mixed civilian-military governments, the questionable election in December, 1980, and the installation of President Milton Obote and his Uganda's Peoples Congress as the governing party can please few in Kenya. A substantial contingent of undisciplined Tanzanian troops remains in Uganda, only slightly less of a danger than its Ugandan counterpart. Thoroughly discredited during the 1960's, Obote and the UPC enjoy limited popular support, mostly confined to certain northern Ugandan areas, and less ability to restore civilian rule. The economy is a shambles and the necessary foreign aid and technical assistance have not been forthcoming. The prospects for renewed violence are considerable, and economic deterioration is widespread. Kenya thus faces an indefinite future, living alongside a very sick neighbor, whose disease may or may not be contagious and from whom little profit can be expected.

[5] David and Marina Ottaway, *Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1978).

Kenya's relations with Tanzania are also deeply troubled, but for other reasons. Under the leadership of President Julius Nyerere since its independence in 1961, Tanzania has moved steadily toward a socialist position based on public sector ownership and public control of industry, incentives to encourage the formation of communal villages and cooperative farming, and measures to limit wealth and income accumulation. Thus Tanzanian socialism is in many respects the antithesis of the freewheeling capitalism espoused in Kenya.[6]

Kenya's political and some civil service and business leaders have become very wealthy, while austerity is the rule of the day in Tanzania. Kenya has a government-owned and operated television station and an estimated 500,000 viewers; Tanzania has steadfastly refused to permit the introduction of television, considered a luxury device. Smallholder Kenyan farmers are encouraged by the government to acquire legal title to their land, to fence it, to borrow on commercial terms, and to employ their neighbors or relatives. Tanzanian farmers are pressured by their government to pool their holdings, to move from their isolated rural homes into new cooperative villages, to sell produce to government corporations at fixed prices, to work the land communally where possible, and to speak Swahili.

The contrast between the capital cities of Dar es Salaam and Nairobi could not be starker. Nairobi's population grows by five to six percent annually and is currently close to 800,000. The city bustles with luxury hotels, traffic jams, boutiques catering to the international tourist trade, the slick offices of various international organizations, and a cosmopolitan population. Nairobi is a European city; its teeming slums in the Mathari Valley, its seedy areas of low-cost housing, and its industrial zone are African. By contrast, Dar es Salaam is a placid harbor city of 200,000, where rural migrants are sent home if they are caught, government offices dominate what little there is of skyline, the heat and the breezes are tropical, and economic activity moves at a slow walk. Yet the Tanzanian government believes that Dar exercises a disproportionate influence on the nation's meager resources and is in the process of moving the capital 400 miles inland to the provincial town of Dodoma.

Divided by style and substance, ideology and cash, Kenya and Tanzania closed their border in 1977, and it has stayed closed. Tourists must detour thousands of miles, since there are no direct flights, although the splendid tourist attractions are only a few hours apart by road on each side of the border. Smuggling, particularly of Kenyan goods into Tanzania, is booming, although it causes considerable bad feelings among government officials. Currencies are not interchangeable, and many people living in the border areas have suffered. A summit meeting in 1979 between Presidents Moi and Nyerere produced no follow-up; both sides stick to now rigid positions over such issues as the division of the remaining assets of the former East African Community, the sorting out of trade and tariff claims and counterclaims, and the future of Uganda.

Wary and weary of its neighbors and their problems, at home Kenya seeks to address the four issues that have determined its history since the construction of the railway in 1900 from Mombasa to the new town of Nairobi at 5,000 feet in the lush highlands. These issues are race, ethnicity, social class, and human and natural resources. In Kenya, the British established a three-tier racially stratified and segregated society that persisted until shortly before independence. Whites, known in East Africa as Europeans, were on top as senior civil servants, army officers, or settlers occupying fine land in the Central Highlands. Indians and Pakistanis, known as Asians, were in the middle, originally emigrating as railway laborers, clerks and artisans and staying as retail and wholesale merchants, skilled and semiskilled workers, and junior civil servants. Africans were on the bottom as farm laborers, often on farms that had been usurped by white settlers, as unskilled urban laborers and domestic servants or in other menial positions.

Kenya's racially stratified society has been turned topsy-turvy. Africans are now on top, in the civil service, in politics, and, increasingly, in the professions and business, although often as managers and not owners. De jure segregation disappeared shortly before independence, and in Nairobi and especially at Mombasa in an explicit multiracial atmosphere there is considerable mixing. The 60,000 Europeans resident in Kenya at independence numbered 50,000 by the time of the 1980 census. More significant, the Europeans are mostly temporary residents, employed by foreign firms, technical assistance organizations, and the Kenya government. The landed white settlers have been largely bought out, with a few acquiring Kenya citizenship and earning a place in the new society, like archaeologist Richard Leakey.

Asians resident in Kenya had dropped to 150,000 in 1980 from 250,000 at independence. Many have emigrated to the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States, and a few have gone to India. Presumably more would leave if emigration were easier. Often selling their rural and small-town businesses to Africans, the Asians have grouped in large-scale retail and wholesale trade in Nairobi and Mombasa. Still characterized by their exclusivity, their many clubs, societies, and religions, the Asians are respected for the economic services they perform even if they are

[6]Alan Amery and David Leonard, "Public Policy, Class and Inequality in Kenya and Tanzania," *Africa Today*, vol. 26, no. 4 (1979), pp. 3-42.

resented for their wealth. There has been almost no intermarriage between Africans or Europeans and Asians or even between Asian communities. As Asians have been squeezed out of business in socialist Tanzania and thrown out of Uganda they are understandably nervous about their future in Kenya.

Given the affluence and visibility of the Asians and Europeans, a race-oriented political party remains a possibility in Kenya. It was attempted by opposition politicians on several occasions during the 1960's, with little success. Yet no Kenya government can afford to be seen as too close to the racial minorities, and if the politics of redistribution of wealth ever prevails, racial minorities will probably be its first targets.

Kenya is a bewildering ethnic mosaic. The census of 1980 recorded a total population of 16 million, growing at 3.5-4.0 percent a year, one of the fastest rates of increase in the world.[7] Infant mortality has been brought down very rapidly in the last 20 years, although it is still high by Western standards. The government has supported family planning since 1966, and international organizations have been most active in this field, but when surveyed in 1978 Kenyan women wanted an average of 7 children. Less than six percent of women of reproductive age (and these mostly educated women in the cities) are currently taking advantage of contraceptive services.[8]

The Kikuyu, with 25 percent of the total population, and the related Embu, Meru and Kamba-speaking peoples with another 10 percent are the core of Kenyan politics and the economy. The Kikuyu lost much of their best land to the white settlers, were the first Kenyan Africans to accept Christianity, and were quickly drawn into the cash economy. Highly individualist and achievement-oriented, the Kikuyu have poured their savings into education for their children, have shown great interest in building rural self-help projects like schools and roads, and have turned readily to freehold farming. Using remittances sent by husbands, friends and relatives in the cities, Kikuyu farmers, often women, have used hybrid seeds, agricultural implements and fertilizer on a rich soil in a temperate climate. Coffee, tea, pyrethrum (a powerful natural insecticide), dairy cattle, vegetables, and other products are grown on the Kikuyu lands.

The Embu, Meru and Kamba have also taken to commercial agriculture, but not with the alacrity of the Kikuyu. Coming from a semi-arid ranching area, the Kamba have provided a disproportionate number of recruits and officers for the police and the army. The politicians from these ethnic groups have deftly formed and maintained alliances with their Kikuyu colleagues, and together they have dominated the post-independence Cabinets.[9]

The Luo are a tall, angular, fishing and farming folk who live in the lowlands of western Kenya along the shores and flood plains of Lake Victoria. Far from the cash economy and cash cropping, they were slow to move into the modern economy, although they made a mark on the railways and in other pursuits. Until his assassination in 1969, their charismatic leader, Tom Mboya, was a talented trade union organizer and one of the few Kenyan politicians with a national rather than a mostly ethnic following. The Nilotic Luo have been plagued by poor leadership, the backward state of their own Nyanza Province, and their difficulty relating to Kenya's other, mostly Bantu, peoples.

Cotton, fishing, sugar and rice have improved the local economy and the fishing port of Kisumu, but the Luo remain restive, trapped on the periphery of national political and economic life. Younger and better educated leaders, more willing to accept minor Cabinet posts, have taken the place of the veteran radical, Oginga Odinga, but the extent of their following remains to be seen.

The Luhya are a Bantu-speaking group of cultivators, with tiny plots on the edge of Mt. Elgon in western Kenya. About 15 percent of the total population, but subject to the highest rural population density in Kenya, the Luhya are rapidly educating their young, including women, and threatening the educational predominance of the Kikuyu. In the past the Luhya have been and could again be a critical swing group in Kenyan politics, throwing their weight behind a coalition that might promise the most for their overcrowded homelands.

The Kalenjin-speaking peoples range from the Karamajong herders to the sophisticated Kipsigi with their farms of wheat and maize. Together the Kalenjin are about 15 percent of the population, divided like the Luhya into many sub-groups and clans. A pastoral people moving swiftly into maize and wheat farming in the Central Highlands and the Western Plains, the Kalenjin show considerable dignity and astuteness in their politics. Daniel Arap Moi, 52-year-old son of a rural schoolmaster from the small Tugen group, has mastered this style of politics, realizing that his power must go well beyond that of his people and their friends.

The Kalenjin have been quick to purchase large settler farms and ranches on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis, often with government credit. Meanwhile the Luhya, Luo and others have crowded into the post-independence high density settlement schemes that put Africans on small plots on once large farms.

Except for the fact that their communal grazing lands include some of the last uncultivated arable land

[7]Frank and Susan Mott, "Kenya's Record Population Growth: A Dilemma of Development," *Population Bulletin,* vol. 35, no. 3 (October, 1980).

[8]*Ibid.,* pp. 30-39.

[9]Khapoya, *op. cit.*

in Kenya, the Masai would escape the political and economic limelight. Clinging to their pastoral and nomadic ways, they have used their limited numbers —200,000—to considerable political advantage in terms of schools, jobs for their few educated members and restraints on land squatters. However, population pressure and the lack of urban jobs may soon threaten their cattle economy.

The huge empty Northeastern Province of Kenya is inhabited by ethnic Somalis, Turkana near Lake Rudolf, Samburu, and other small groups. Whatever the attraction of secession, its manifestation has been limited. Perhaps the politicians in Nairobi are quietly relieved that the 7,500-man army can be given combat exposure in these desolate areas, away from the distractions of the capital.

Kenya's coast is a world apart, ethnically and geographically. Afro-Arab in civilization for several hundred years, Swahili-speaking, and operating on a more langorous scale, the coast is the home of the Giriama, Bajan, Taita and other peoples. Living on coastal fishing, coconuts, sisal, sugar, and mostly West European tourism, the coastal peoples have long looked with disdain on the people of the interior. As 15 percent of the population, their numbers have never been reflected in the Cabinet, and few of their leaders have achieved national rank. The coast has sought administrative and political decentralization to avoid being dominated by Nairobi. The striking economic growth of Mombasa, based on tourism, shipping, the oil refinery, and other new industries has given it a new self-confidence.

Most Kenyans cling to their ethnic identities. English and Swahili are both official languages, used in Parliament, on radio and television and in the streets. However, most Kenyans at home utilize an ethnic language, as they tend to vote for candidates from their ethnic group. The composition of the Cabinet, in which nearly half the 158 members of Parliament will be given some kind of position, is a delicate balancing act.[10] It has been dominated since independence by Attorney General Charles Njonjo, Finance Minister and Vice President Mwai Kibaki, and several other Kikuyu. Yet Daniel Arap Moi is neither their instrument nor their subordinate. He is a master of ethnic politics, and used his first days as President to shake up the army and the senior civil service, and to build his own networks. The Kenyatta clique generated widespread dislike because of their flagrant corruption, immunity to prosecution, and abuse of power. Moi has sought to reduce corruption but has quickly come up against the combination of ethnicity and class that rules in Kenya.

Although primary identities remain ethnic, Kenyans can also be classified by social class. The ownership of an automobile, the ability to send one's children to private schools, liquor bills, types of homes, use of English, and other refinements are all reasonable indicators. Perhaps 5 percent of Kenyan Africans, almost all men, constitute a new, rough upper class. These are the senior civil servants, professionals, businessmen, and prosperous farmers who are at the top of the new society. Unlike the situation in Tanzania, there are no rules against civil servants acquiring land; and many have several sources of income. Below them is a growing urban middle class and its rural counterpart of small shopkeepers, artisans, farmers, skilled workers, government mid-level employees like teachers, and others. Unskilled and semiskilled urban workers, including vendors and others in the informal sector, can be called an urban lower class. Only 15 percent of the Kenyan population lived in urban areas in 1980.

The uneven extension of freehold tenure throughout much of Kenya makes rural classification difficult. Among the Kikuyu, where almost all land is owned privately, there are tenant farmers, landless laborers, smallholders, and medium-sized farmers with husbands in each group often working in the cities.[11] Except for a few fenced ranches, there is still little private property among the Masai. However in the emerging pattern, prosperous smallholders using modern innovations live alongside tenant farmers and landless laborers. For better or worse, capitalism has come to the Kenyan countryside.

Alongside race, class, and ethnicity, Kenya must somehow grapple with the issue of population and limited resources. Less than 20 percent of Kenya consists of arable land with reliable rainfall. Irrigation with heavy capital costs could perhaps add another 5-10 percent. No significant mineral deposits have been found in Kenya, offshore oil exploration has been discouraging, and already 30 percent of Kenya's exports go for imported petroleum, mostly from Saudi Arabia. The population is growing rapidly, with more than 50 percent under 15 years of age; thus even with reduced fertility, growth will continue. Squatters are already encroaching on land most suitable for grazing, especially in light of the recent history of major droughts in East Africa.

Kenya earns its way in the world through the cultivation of coffee, tea, pyrethrum, sisal, pineapples and other crops, through international tourism attracted by its superb climate and magnificent parks and beaches, and by providing goods and services for its own population and its neighbors.[12] It is a fragile

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[10]*Ibid.*

[11]Collier and Lal, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-35.

[12]Arthur Hazlewood, *The Economy of Kenya* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

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"South Africa is a society of rampant and frenetic white materialism and abject black poverty, bitterness and hopelessness. Every day, serious crime becomes more of a reality to whites living in the surburbs, causing yet another layer of insecurity for those already uncertain and insecure about their status in a predominantly African country."

South Africa: The Politics of Change

By Patrick O'Meara

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When the Afrikaner-dominated National party first came to power in South Africa in 1948, it began to construct and implement its apartheid policy actively.[1] Under the changed political conditions of 1981, its main preoccupation is to hold onto power. Frequently, it merely reacts to black discontent and seeks to contain it by resorting to the police or the military, and this often proves difficult because of the anomic nature of the demonstrations and riots. Keeping the situation contained, however, has not precluded an escalation and widening of the confrontation. Indeed, after every clash, blacks (and this is the term which now increasingly includes Coloreds, Indians and Africans) seem more determined in their opposition to the white system. In the face of this reality, efforts to restructure South Africa's parliamentary system by means of the current constitutional changes appear trivial and escapist. As an astute academic maintained recently in Cape Town, "The revolution is not about to happen. We are living in the midst of it."

It is against this background of escalating black demands that proposed government changes and reforms must be measured. Over the years, changes have been proposed and implemented, but they have never been sufficiently far-reaching. The changes proposed in 1980-1981 go further than ever, but they still attempt only to redress certain black grievances, especially in the urban areas, without substantial white concessions. In all instances, they aim to maintain white control by the limited appeasement of blacks. Inevitably, black manifestations of discontent will occur with increasing severity. Blacks are becoming more and more aware of their labor power, their buying power, and their corporate ability to control both of these. Increasingly, black students are acting as agents of change.

For the moment, the South African government wants simply to contain black discontent. This does not mean that it will not resort to even more authoritarian controls if it believes that circumstances warrant such a move. The government still has vast power and firmly controls the police and the military; it also has the full support of most white South Africans. However, its ability to maneuver is becoming more restricted, and ultimately it may be forced to choose between a diluted form of apartheid or a move toward naked totalitarian repression.

The African National Congress (ANC), which was banned in South Africa in 1960, has operated from other African countries and from London ever since. It recently claimed direct responsibility for the successful June, 1980, raid against SASOL, the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation, a huge installation for turning coal into oil. The psychological impact of this raid was enormous because of South Africa's vulnerable oil position. The ANC saw this as the beginning of the new era of urban sabotage emanating from the black townships: "Our masses have to serve as our bush. The black community is our bush."[2]

This spirit of African resistence was vividly apparent when Pieter Koornhof, Minister of Cooperation and Development, visited Soweto under heavy police protection in October, 1980, to receive the freedom of the city from the Soweto Community Council. Blacks in Soweto responded with riots, strikes and ironic statements: "How can he be made an honorary citizen if we who live here are not even citizens."[3] In 1981, black South Africa is animated by the spirit of the Black Consciousness Movement and is characterized by almost daily protests, violent clashes, strikes and death. South African blacks continue to regard Afrikaans as the language of oppression and categorically refuse to use it in any form of social or business interaction.

An important side effect of apartheid is the alarming increase in the crime rate in South Africa over the past few years. *Repetitive Cycles,* an excellent study by Mana Slabbert of Cape Town University, points out that Cape Town has one of the highest crime rates in the Western world. Moreover, South Africa has the highest *per capita* prison population in the world, with

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[1]The African Studies Program at Indiana University, the Dean of International Programs and the School of Public and Environmental Affairs made possible a 1980 research trip to South Africa. Part of the contents of this paper is based on interviews and observations made at that time.

[2]*The New York Times,* June 20, 1980.

[3]*The Washington Post,* October 17, 1980.

a daily average of more than 100,000 prisoners, over twice the United States average.[4] This crime rate cannot be dismissed, as white South Africans so often do, as an indication that blacks are "uncivilized." It is a direct consequence of the economic and social dislocations caused by apartheid. The current boom resulting from the high price of gold has barely touched black South Africans, but it has already resulted in tax benefits for whites.

South Africa is a society of rampant and frenetic white materialism and abject black poverty, bitterness and hopelessness. Every day, serious crime becomes more of a reality to whites living in the suburbs, causing yet another layer of insecurity for those already uncertain and insecure about their status.

In an effort to resolve the impasse between increasing black militancy and white vested interests, the South African government is attempting to implement major constitutional change. Early in 1980, the government abolished the Senate, the Upper House of the South African Parliament, and replaced it with a nominated President's Council, during a special session of Parliament on October 6, 1980. The President's Council is to advise the government on a new constitution and consists of 59 nominated members (43 whites, 10 Coloreds, 5 Indians and 1 Chinese). The glaring but calculated omission of any African members from the Council has been the cause of considerable criticism and has challenged the legitimacy both of the Council and of the proposed constitutional changes.

Initially, Prime Minister P.W. Botha planned to establish a separate African advisory group, to be appointed by the government and to be consulted by the President's Council. This separate entity was rejected outright both by urban and homeland leaders, and it was never set up.

Prime Minister Botha sees the President's Council in a utopian way as "the first of its kind in that it transcends political and racial barriers in order to deliberate on constitutional matters."[5] He regards it as a vital instrument in his "adapt or die" strategy, but the exclusion of Africans is a patent flaw and brings into question the government's real willingness to adapt. The Council's ultimate constitutional proposals might at best lead to limited representation for Coloreds and Indians in Parliament, based on a separate voters' roll or possibly even on full enfranchisement. Even such proposals would fall far short of the radical and innovative changes for the majority of Africans that are essential for long-term political stability.

Even though South Africa has elevated the Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda to so-called "independent" status[6] and soon proposes to do the same for the Ciskei, its homeland policy is in disarray. Prime Minister P.W. Botha's proposed "constellation of states" is an attempt to find a new formula into which the existing homeland policy can be fitted.

The homelands have become little more than rural slums. Development has been minimal and problems have been compounded by the forced resettlement of hundreds of thousands of Africans and the increased rigidities of influx control laws. The Bureau for Economic Research in Pretoria realistically sums up the position: "It is evident that the development necessary to make separate development economically viable did not take place in the homelands." The economic failure of the homelands policy is apparent in the Prime Minister's statement that

> It is impossible to consolidate the geographical area of each national group in such a way that it will become economically viable on its own. And, of course, we cannot give away the whole of South Africa merely to create economically viable black states.

Given this unwillingness to part with more land, this new policy shifts from the allocation of land to that of economic co-existence with the homelands. Thus the constellation of states aims at "a system of regional economic cooperation between peoples who are politically organized in different ways."

From the government's point of view, the constellation is a confederation that will continue to emphasize political and ethnic separation, but in which (it is hoped) a new form of economic interdependence will evolve. Thus the fiction of discreet political institutions will be maintained, while economic cooperation will be fostered. Given the abject poverty in the homelands, where malnutrition is rampant, this will need a massive injection of capital. The resources of the homelands are marginal; hence the magnitude of outside capital required to make even minimal improvements is staggering.

For the moment, the constellation is mainly focused on the homelands, but this does not exclude the possibility of wider application by including adjacent countries like Lesotho. Gerhardus De Kock, the chairman of the Constellation Committee, expects somewhat unrealistically a "brand new concept of economic development and cooperation in certain regions, that transcend political and ethnic boundaries."

BLACK COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT

At the end of October, 1980, the government published a draft of the *Black Community Development Act* which, together with two other bills, proposes to ease some of the restrictions on urban blacks by repealing more than 50 existing discriminatory laws. On the surface this new legislation, which is to be presented

[4] *Repetitive Cyles* (Cape Town: Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 1980).

[5] *Christian Science Monitor,* October 7, 1980.

[6] There has been no international recognition for any of the so-called independent homelands.

to Parliament at the 1981 session, would provide urban blacks with greater freedom of movement and a more secure family life. It proposes that descendants of any person legally resident in urban areas would have the right to live there. In addition such legal residents would have the right to move from one township to another in order to find work, with the proviso that such an individual find housing as well as a job. Currently, blacks who are not legal urban residents may only remain in an urban area for 72 hours. Under the new law, the stay would be technically increased to a yearly aggregate of 30 days. But, at the same time, it would place heavy restrictions on black non-urban migrants, who could be more easily endorsed out of urban areas. Fines of up to $600 and prison sentences of up to six months and the confiscation of vehicles are penalties for illegal migrants or for those who employ or house them.

Minister Pieter Koornhof is wrong in his statements that many black people would now "be on a par with white people," or "that blacks would now be able to move freely just as a white man has the right in South Africa." No law has ever required whites to justify their stay in urban areas by proving that they have adequate housing. It should not be forgotten that in Soweto alone about 33,000 blacks are now on a waiting list for housing. This does not bode well for the new legislation.

The South African Council of Churches believes that this legislation would disqualify large numbers of blacks born in South Africa from being or remaining in the urban areas of South Africa. Similarly, the abolition of "passes" and the substitution of identity cards does not mean that the effects of the pass laws will change. The government is clearly trying to coopt a segment of the population and to give it a stake in the existing political system. Many blacks see this not as the "normalizing of race relations," but rather as yet another divide and conquer tactic.

OTHER CHANGES

Changes have been promised or have already taken place in regard to some of the existing and more repugnant aspects of the apartheid legislation; for example, repeal of the Immorality Act and of Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act has been discussed. Botha maintains that South Africa does not depend on these laws for its survival. African trade unions have been legalized and can be registered officially, but they must undergo a long and cumbersome registration process. At this writing only a few African unions have been approved, thus far only those with segregated membership; black racially mixed unions have not yet been approved.

Today, there are more than six million black workers in South Africa, and this is an era of increasing black awareness of the power of organized labor. Black workers are asking for higher wages, better working conditions, and official recognition of their unions. But this is not simply a labor struggle, but a part of the political struggle from which it cannot be divorced. Strikes have become commonplace over the past year in a wide number of various industries and in many parts of the country. In the 1980's, South Africa will find itself in the midst of a continuing and more violent political-labor struggle. While the white government has been willing to make some concessions, these are clearly not adequate for the black workers who comprise between 60 and 70 percent of South Africa's work force.

Some changes have been promised in regard to African education. Currently, each year $1,000 per white child is allocated by the government, $300 per each Colored child and $100 for each African child. Compulsory education for all 8 million young Africans is supposed to begin next year. This is certainly a concession on the part of the government and part of Prime Minister Botha's "adapt or die" strategy. But it must not be forgotten that the government has closed 77 schools in various parts of the country because of black student boycotts and that it will continue to use and control education. The extent of the proposed reforms of African education is not clear and whether they are substantial or mere window dressing will only become apparent in the next year or two. It is probable that the proposed compulsory education for Africans will not go beyond the primary school level; and the quality of education also remains questionable.

Recent Cabinet changes are another example of the Prime Minister's attempt to control his party and to strengthen its *verligte* (enlightened) wing. The right-wing *(verkrampte)* of the party led by Andries Treuricht has been effectively neutralized. General Magnus Malan, formerly head of the army and a staunch supporter of Botha's, is now in the Cabinet as Minister of Defense, thus illustrating the importance of the military portfolio, and Gerrit Viljoen, a verligte, is seen as an important and direct check to Andries Treuricht's power. Treuricht is now Minister of State Administration, responsible for the white civil service. The former Minister of Justice, Alwyn Schlebush, has been nominated Vice State President and will be Chair of the President's Council. But it must be emphasized that verligte-verkrampte distinctions are differences of degree but not of basic principles.

Black urban leaders like Bishop Desmond Tutu and N. Motlana of Soweto have long since rejected changes that do not result from negotiations that include prominent black leaders like the imprisoned leader of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, who has been serving a life sentence since 1964. Botha has made it clear that he is not willing to release Mandela but only to explore alternative strategies with those whom he

considers legitimate representatives of the African people. Thus he repeats the error made in Zimbabwe by Ian Smith, who refused to recognize the popular support for Robert Mugabe until a bitter guerrilla war forced him to do so.

Over the past months, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of Kwazulu, the most outspoken and prominent of the homeland leaders, has increasingly come under fire from blacks in South Africa. For some time, the relationship between Buthelezi and the ANC, the largest exiled liberation movement, has been ambiguous. Buthelezi has emphasized his ties with the ANC and has said that he shared its aspirations. In turn, the African National Congress has never directly rejected him. There seemed to be a tacit understanding that he and his powerful Inkatha movement, numbering some 300,000 paid-up members, the largest in South African history, represented an internal dimension of the liberation process.

In June and July, 1980, however, the ANC—and specifically its leader, Oliver Tambo, long thought to be a close friend of Buthelezi—began to criticize Buthelezi for "the role he is playing in suppressing the struggles of the workers and the students. . . ." A sharp rift has emerged between the ANC and Buthelezi, initially caused by Buthelezi's high-handed stifling of student boycotters in the Kwamashu township near Durban, which is under his control.

The ANC and Buthelezi differ in their strategies and approaches. As head of the Inkatha movement, Buthelezi has massive Zulu backing and support at least in Kwazulu, if not in all of the urban areas. At the same time, the ANC is beginning a powerful new urban liberation offensive. Their differences might very well be caused by their competing power bases.

Many of the proposed changes of policy have certainly not met with unanimous Afrikaner support. Indeed, the National party is now a party "with almost as many policy variations as it has members." This is also true of the broader Afrikaans community. For example, in August, 1980, a group of Afrikaans students broke away from the long established Afrikaner Studente Bond (ASB) to form a new group, POLSTU, which called for equal citizenship for all. In the right wing of the party, in contrast, the son-in-law of former Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, Professor Carel Boshoff of the theology department at Pretoria University, who is now said to be the head of the Broederbond (the still important Afrikaans secret society) has called for a white homeland in the Orange Free State.

Much of what his father-in-law, Prime Minister Verwoerd, held sacred in the 1960's now seems expendable. Verwoerd feared any compromise that would have regarded blacks as more than temporary residents of white areas. Instead, in 1981, it is recognized that some blacks may have a stake in the urban areas, and that the homeland policy has failed and must be modified by a new formula.

But what is the ultimate significance of all these shifts and changes? James North raises this key question in a recent issue of *The Nation*,[7] "Can South Africa find a significant number of black allies as it slips into a state of revolutionary war?" The answer is probably not.

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA

Many white South Africans were jubilant at the Ronald Reagan victory in November, 1980. How will the Reagan administration's policy toward South Africa differ from that of President Jimmy Carter? Prime Minister Botha has already aimed comments at the new administration. In a recent speech, he once again emphasized South Africa's strategic importance and its anti-Communist stance. "If you believe in South Africa's importance in terms of strategic minerals, food production and military facilities then you must strengthen the government's hand and help make it a bastion against communism."

While it cannot be denied that President Reagan will be more sympathetic to South Africa, fundamental changes in United States policy will probably not occur. Diplomatic relations will undoubtedly improve and there will be a more friendly climate, particularly since diplomats like U.N. Ambassadors Andrew Young and Donald McHenry were particularly disliked by the South African government. But embargoes on weapons and nuclear fuel supplies will continue. President Reagan's Africa policy will have to take into account the fact that South Africa does not exist in a vacuum. Nigeria is now the second largest supplier of oil to the United States and exports half of its 2.4 million barrels a day of oil to the United States. On a state visit to the United States in October, 1980, President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria made his position on South Africa clear:[8]

> Nigeria will use any means at our disposal including oil

(Continued on page 134)

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[7] *The Nation,* August 30-September 6, 1980.
[8] *Wall Street Journal,* October 7, 1980.

"An examination of the constraints on Uganda's recovery and development shows the wide-ranging nature of the post-liberation crisis."

Rehabilitation in Uganda

BY DONALD ROTHCHILD
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THE Idi Amin regime in Uganda bequeathed a grim legacy; its successors, in the words of a senior minister in the post-liberation government, "inherited a country in ruins."[1] Misrule resulted in the near destruction of the country's delicately maintained political order and in the near complete bankruptcy of its economy. With both polity and economy in situations of serious disrepair, neither is in a position to support the rehabilitation of the other, and each is in danger of a further decline. In such circumstances, how can a country like Uganda achieve rehabilitation? The problem is particularly intriguing as Uganda's potential for economic development is substantial in comparison to many other less developed countries; moreover, were a sizable proportion of those in exile to return, the country would possess a stronger than average complement of educated, skilled professional cadres who could in principle be mobilized toward developmental ends.*

Certainly the Uganda economy and political system were something less than robust in the 1960's. Two agricultural crops, cotton and coffee, accounted for over 80 percent of export earnings; however, because of deteriorating terms of trade, a growing volume of such exports brought little increase in foreign exchange earnings. Copper mining, which provided Uganda with an additional £3 million in export earnings, was of marginal significance to the economy as a whole. Similarly, earnings from tea, textiles and cement as well as tourism, while a boost to the national well-being, were not sufficient to lift the economy to a high plateau. The economy was able to meet the most critical economic and social demands placed upon it, but it lacked the capacity or will to mobilize and distribute resources on a sufficiently wide basis to satisfy the legitimate expectations of the less advantaged classes and regions.

On the political side, the regime of A. Milton Obote moved by stages to consolidate power in terms of the party system and the country as a whole. In August, 1964, the alliance with Buganda-based Kabaka Yekka was terminated and, as a result of numerous defections from the opposition parties, the ruling Uganda People's Congress (UPC) gained a numerically dominant position in the legislature. However, no sooner was party control within its grasp when the UPC divided over the government's alleged involvement in a scandal regarding the possible theft of Zaire's gold and ivory. In an effort to regain control of the situation, Obote acted swiftly—suspending the constitution, arresting five ministers, and appointing himself the country's provisional executive President.[2] The collective leadership that had prevailed in the UPC gave way, in 1966, to a more powerful (but still not overweening) party presidency under Obote's leadership.

Obote's strong measures in 1966 ensured his political survival. Yet his tendency to reconcile many of the existing central and regional forces in the subsequent 1966-1971 period meant that he never gained more than a limited ability to manipulate his environment. Several options were explored and utilized to his advantage: greater use of the central administrative apparatus, the building of a new basis of support through the "move to the left," the ending of the kingdoms and the liquidation of their federal relationships to the center, and the banning of opposition parties. But despite these tactics, aimed at enhancing central authority, Obote's ability to influence people and events was always limited by internal contradictions within the party and the state machinery.

In brief, the Ugandan state and society of the 1960's continued to operate largely in terms of the system inherited from colonial times. The economy remained heavily dependent upon the export of its two main cash crops, and the political system reflected the pragmatism of its leader in accommodating to various

*Delivered at the 23rd annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 15-18, 1980.

[1]Repulic of Uganda, *Budget Speech Delivered at the National Assembly, Kampala on Tuesday, 4th December, 1979, by the Minister of Finance Honorable Jack A.P.M. Sentongo* (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1979), p.1.

[2]Ali A. Mazrui, "Leadership in Africa: Obote of Uganda," *International Journal,* vol. no. 3 (summer, 1970), pp. 546-49. Also see A.G.G. Gingyera Pinycwa, "A Decade of Independence in Uganda: The Political Balance Sheet," *Africa Quarterly,* vol. 12, no. 2 (July-September, 1972), pp. 81-84.

and changing centralist, regionalist and modernist interest group pressures. Despite Obote's growing isolation and evident impatience with the elements that ranged against him, it was Idi Amin's military coup in 1971 that altered the existing social and political structure in a significant way. This change from civilian "normality" to military hegemony was less a transformation of the postcolonial state than its brutalization. As noted above, Obote had come increasingly to rely on force to maintain the unity of Uganda. His successor, General Amin, carried arbitrariness and unpredictability to their outer limits, making violence the cornerstone of his regime's survival.[3] Ali A. Mazrui sums up the situation accurately: ". . . in Uganda under Amin the light went out and norms and values cultivated over generations came abruptly to an end."[4] The consequence was a political and economic retrogression that left Uganda devastated and demoralized.

It is not easy to convey the extent of the political, economic, and social decay under Amin. A commonplace in Uganda in early 1980 holds that Amin could not have done a better job of destroying Uganda if he had tried—a point of view with some substance for anyone who lived in the country during his rule. Between 1971 and 1979, Ugandans witnessed the thoroughgoing destruction of their institutions, norms and values. What was left was an anarchic social environment where the capacity to channel purposive behavior in constructive directions was largely lacking. The decline of political and economic institutions brought in their wake a *magendo* (black market) way of life that mocked legitimate and open forms of private and public behavior. Thus the incoherence of Amin's policies and practices led, in the end, to the unraveling of many of the strands binding individuals and groups in a social order.

In tangible terms, the decline in available goods and services during Amin's period of rule was apparent at every turn. Inflation soared out of control, carrying the cost of farm implements, hard goods, and foodstuffs out of the reach of all but the most privileged. Only a tiny minority could secure bank loans to stock their businesses, modernize their plant and equipment, or build houses. Those, like key civil servants, who could gain access to foreign exchange or import licenses or those in various walks of life who could profit from the lucrative trade in smuggled coffee did manage to benefit from the general collapse of the economic structure. However, the general public suffered a situation of widespread impoverishment. Health, transportation and water services declined sharply in quality. Common necessities like hoes, fertilizers, foodstuffs and drugs became unavailable, making the life-styles of past decades difficult to sustain. It was no exaggeration to argue that "in five years the level of economic activity has probably regressed by more than fifty."[5]

At heart, it was the oppressiveness of Amin's style of governance, combined with his inflationary monetary and fiscal policies, that led to a disruption of the Ugandan economy. Arbitrary rule, which affected all communities in the country simultaneously, received world attention because of the way it affected the expatriate communities. Responding to deeply felt popular grievances over past trade malpractices on the part of Asian businessmen, Amin declared an "economic war" against non-citizens and introduced a series of regulations affecting trade and residence that made their continued commercial and business activities impossible for all practical purposes. The consequence of this takeover of foreign businesses and the expulsion of the Asian community (most citizens as well as non-citizens) was to disrupt the system by which credit was extended and goods and produce marketed. As a number of highly accomplished Africans also departed from the scene (albeit more quietly), it became difficult to find qualified managers and technicians to replace them. This exodus of skills (and their capital) also had a marked effect on aggregate productivity. Businesses operated at less than full capacity, stores ran down their stocks, marketing channels became clogged, and supplies of spare parts and goods became scarce. Such economic reverses helped bankrupt the marketing and processing institutions intended to serve rural peoples.

With respect to the Amin regime's expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, former Finance Minister Jack Sentongo noted that the money supply jumped from Shs. 1.7 billion in December, 1970, to Shs. 10.3 billion at the end of March, 1979. Foreign aid from traditional sources declined significantly, and the government relied heavily on loans from the banking system to cover increasing budgetary deficits. Since the marketed domestic output of goods and services was in slight decline, this increase in the supply of money inevitably created severe inflationary pressures.[6] To mitigate the effects of soaring inflation, the Amin government proceeded to install price controls on specified commodities and cash crops, only to cause a drop in the output of these export crops. The reduced foreign exchange earnings resulting from this move led in turn to increasing trade deficits—and a

[3]Garth Glentworth and Ian Hancock, "Obote and Amin: Change and Continuity in Modern Uganda Politics," *African Affairs,* vol. 72, no. 288 (July, 1973), p. 242.

[4]Ali A. Mazrui, "Between Development and Decay: Anarchy, Tyranny and Progress under Idi Amin," *Third World Quarterly,* vol. 2, no. 1 (January, 1980), p. 57.

[5]E.A. Brett, "Relations of Production, the State and the Ugandan Crisis," *The West African Journal of Sociology and Political Science,* vol. 1, no. 3 (January, 1978), p. 249. See also Peter Enahoro, "Inside Amin's Uganda," *Africa,* no. 69 (May, 1977), pp. 72-73.

[6]*Budget Speech,* 1979, p. 8.

falloff in critically needed import goods. The cash crop farmer, seeing the real price of coffee drop from 100 in 1970-1971 to 37 in 1978, not surprisingly turned to food crops where the profit margins were higher. In a parallel move, lower income office workers in Kampala, faced with a rise in cost of living from 100 in 1970-71 to 785 in 1978, were forced in many cases to take on additional employment, to participate in the *magendo* economy, or to return to the rural areas.[7] The effect of this was to reduce even further business and industrial output as well as the quality of the public services.

Just how dramatic the collapse of the modern economy was is made clear from available statistics on production trends. Whereas the overall percentage of subsistence agriculture to total GDP rose by 3 percent in the 1970-78 period, the monetary economy dropped from Shs. 5.1 billion in 1970 to Shs. 4.4 billion in 1978.[8] Coffee production, which contributed 93 percent of Uganda's foreign exchange earnings in 1977, showed declines in output; nevertheless, it is difficult to be precise about the extent of the decrease, both because of smuggling activities (which accounted for 50,000 tons per annum in the last years of Amin's rule) and because of the possible understatement of Coffee Marketing Board purchases.[9] With respect to other cash crops and manufactured items, however, the fall in output is marked. Cotton growers, faced with difficulties in securing seed, chemical inputs, hoes, ox-ploughs, tractors, credit facilities, transportation, and adequate prices and goods, retreated from cash-crop to subsistence agriculture. The consequence was an estimated decline in this once leading Uganda export from 76,000 tons in 1970 to 15,000 in 1978-1979. A roughly similar story is evident for tea, sugar and tobacco as well as for such critically important manufactured goods as soap, vegetable oil, and corrugated iron sheets. It would seem that Amin's most effective war was waged against the Uganda economy itself.

In intangible or less quantifiable aspects, Amin's stay in power also took a heavy toll in terms of a diminished consenus on political norms and values, a deterioration in administrative linkages and capabilities, and a general decline in public morale. The capriciousness and arbitrariness of Amin's government practices undermined the subtle set of relationships among decision-makers essential to the smooth operation of a political system. Government became personalized and unpredictable, with the consequence that over time the general public lost all sense of clarity about its objectives and confidence in its judgment or procedures. Moreover, the arbitrariness and loss of direction at the top soon had an adverse effect on civil service efficiency and *esprit de corps*. Many skilled administrators, fearful for their personal security and downwardly mobile in terms of the reward structure of society, emigrated to other countries, took on additional jobs, participated in *magendo,* or left the urban centers to return to their rural homelands. As trained personnel departed and the administrative apparatus deteriorated, planning became fitful, public services were demonstrably inefficient, coordination between central branches proved ineffective, and linkages between the center and periphery weakened. Not surprisingly, the Uganda public showed clear signs of demoralization as a result of this political and administrative loss of capability. In sum, Amin's legacy to the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) was political, economic and psychological malaise symbolized by a *magendo* way of life.

THE POST-LIBERATION CRISIS

Perhaps nothing demonstrated Amin's lack of roots in Uganda's political life more clearly than the regime's surprisingly swift collapse in the face of the Tanzanian invasion. It was one thing to keep real or potential opposition elements at bay by means of terror tactics; it was an entirely different matter to mobilize nationwide support for a defense of the regime. Outside his tiny Nubian base in the political and administrative system, Amin lost whatever backing in the society he might have had initially and, not surprisingly, fell rapidly from power with the advance of the Tanzanian army and Ugandan exile forces.[10]

The Uganda National Liberation Front, summoned to Moshi, Tanzania, on March 22, 1979, to coordinate the Ugandan struggle against Amin's tyranny, moved quickly to assume political responsibility in the liberated areas. Spokesmen representing all political philosophies and ethnic groups held a series of discussions over a two-day period under the chairmanship of Semei Nyanzi, the former chairman of the Uganda Development Corporation. At its conclusion, the conferees announced that they had created a single, all-embracing body, the UNLF. The conference also issued what became known as the Moshi Communiqué, which the delegates adopted prior to their adjournment on March 25, 1979. This communiqué called for the establishment of the rule of law, the restoration of the people's dignity, respect for personal liberty and human rights, the arrangement of free elections based on a universal adult franchise, the launching of a program of reconstruction and rehabilitation, and the establishing of friendly relations with neighboring states and the international community.

[7] See Commonwealth Team of Experts, *The Rehabilitation of the Economy of Uganda,* vol. 2 (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1979), p. 33.

[8] *Budget Speech,* 1979, p. 3.

[9] Commonwealth Team, *op cit.,* p. 63.

[10] See Michael Twaddle, "The Ousting of Idi Amin," *Round Table,* no. 275 (July, 1979), pp. 216-21.

Rather than executing this mandate on its own, the UNLF elected an executive council to act as an interim administrative body. Y. K. Lule was appointed its chairman, entrusted with the task of forming the interim government body. Lule accepted the post and appointed a Cabinet consisting of four ministers from Buganda Region, four from Eastern Region, four from Western Region, and three from Northern Region. After only 68 days in power, the National Consultative Council replaced Lule with fellow Muganda leader, Godfrey Binaisa. Many Baganda have expressed their bitter resentment over this change, seeing it as a move on the part of the more radical members of the Consultative Council to appoint a President more closely tied to the Obote supporters in the country.

The UNLF also established a proto-parliamentary body, the National Consultative Council, and initially appointed 30 members, all former exiles, as members. The council was ideologically diverse, originally embracing a number of exile groups with various orientations. Because of public resentment of the dominant role played by these exile representatives in the council proceedings, the council was expanded to 90 members in October, 1979, and a number of Ugandans who had stayed behind under the Amin regime (many of whom had a more conservative ideological orientation) were co-opted into that body. By the spring of 1980, the great political issue remained the setting of a date for the elections. Following the collapse of the old order, a general election was essential to assure governmental legitimacy as well as the public support necessary for political stability and economic development. When the elections were finally held in December, 1980, A. Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress secured a majority of seats in the new Parliament; although marred by irregularities, the general election was nonetheless described by the Commonwealth observers as constituting "a valid electoral exercise."

During the period between the Moshi meetings and the December elections, the UNLF proclaimed a number of policy objectives. It would be less than accurate to contend that these objectives amounted to a coherent policy package; even so, the general lines of UNLF thinking began to emerge by April, 1980. The UNLF proclaimed such goals as national unity, the restoration of democracy, national independence, and social progress. It also sought to promote an equitable incomes policy as well as more balanced development among the regions. In the economic sphere, it committed itself to a mixed economy, an apparent compromise on the part of the diverse factions constituting the National Consultative Council. At the outset, it was quite emphatic on the government's primary responsibility for the management of the economy. The state was to play a leading role in the industrial, agricultural, tourism, and mining sectors, while leaving private enterprise with a significant occupational purpose in such fields as transportation, general trading, and medium- and small-scale farming. Particularly noteworthy in the UNLF statement was the recognition that opportunities for participating in development in the various aspects of the society had not been as equitable as they might have been under the Obote regime. Consequently, the paper emphasized that more attention should be given to the requirements of rural peoples, characteristically small farmers, both in production assistance and in services.

In other areas, the UNLF government called for effective development planning at the central level, consideration of decentralized, multi-sectoral planning in and for the rural areas, steps toward devaluation of the currency, agrarian reform, revitalization of the tourist industry, and so forth. However, as of March, 1980, the government of Uganda had taken few if any steps toward these objectives. The Ministry of Planning had not yet set out its longer-term planning objectives, and little had been done to rank priorities as regards to fiscal, monetary, or longer-term developmental programs. Significantly, despite the prodding of various external lending agencies, no devaluation had occurred. Some prices had been raised to stimulate participation by small farmers in the officially organized market for export crops, but the black market in currency and in goods remained so prevalent that little had actually been done to establish official terms of trade favorable to the small farmers; consequently, the farmers continued to find it advantageous to produce subsistence crops or to trade illegally in exportable items. The private sector was by and large the *magendo* sector. It included officials whose positions gave them particularly favorable access to scarce goods and foreign exchange, benefiting none but a well-placed few. The question remains, therefore, whether Uganda's increased reliance upon the private sector represented a true shift in policy or, more simply, was a surrender to enveloping class interests—as expressed through participation in black market activities.

The collapse of the economic and political systems during the years of Amin's misrule and the subsequent war of liberation greatly constrained the ability of the UNLF government to achieve its professed policy objectives. To some extent the factors involved in this collapse represent enduring problems for the Uganda polity and suggest correspondingly long-term processes leading to their amelioration. Others are more directly attributable to the Amin era and the liberation war and may prove more short-term in nature. The key to the rehabilitation effort is to link the resolution of major short-term rehabilitation needs to longer term processes and objectives. Only a few of the salient dimensions of rehabilitation leading

to restored development planning can be considered in the limited space allowed here.

Security. President Godfrey Binaisa remarked in an interview in the fall of 1979 that "security is the main worry I am trying to settle."[11] The collapse of the Amin regime created serious difficulties for Uganda's law enforcement agencies. At the time of liberation, when prisoners of all kinds had been released and some of Amin's troops were reportedly still at large in the countryside, the Uganda police force consisted of a mere 2,000 men. Despite plans to increase UNLF forces to 10,000 and to recruit some 7,000 policemen, the country remained dependent for its security on a force of approximately 20,000 Tanzanian troops, not all of whom were professional soldiers. Tanzanian soldiers, with help from a British mission, began training a new Uganda army and police constabulary soon after liberation. These started to replace the Tanzanian units in the spring of 1980; not only was it expensive to maintain the Tanzanian contingents abroad but, reportedly, President Julius Nyerere was unhappy with the progress being made by Uganda authorities in resolving their differences and promoting the country's development.

Underlying the security problem was the collapse of the colonially inherited system and its values as well as the absence of any legitimized successor to Amin. The troops, both Tanzanian and Ugandan, were called on to sustain a political order that was not adequately defined or validated and hence, in a real sense, did not exercise legitimate authority. Gratitude to the Tanzanians for helping to overthrow Amin was not extended to their service as protectors of a post-liberation political order. Outwardly, the National Consultative Council probably appeared generally representative of the population but this was tested conclusively when the general election was held in December, 1980.

The council's internal balances of power proved too fragile to permit government officials to act assertively in dealing with the country's many socioeconomic ills. Lacking a real mandate, the UNLF government was unable to acquire legitimacy through its handling of the immediate economic and social crises. By rescheduling national elections, the military commission hoped to set in motion processes that would assure greater government effectiveness and stability. In light of the broad support for the Democratic party in Buganda (as well as the opposition's grievances over the handling of the elections), it remains unclear whether the general election will have the stabilizing effect so critical to Uganda's well-being.

[11] *Africa Report*, vol. 24, no. 6 (November-December, 1979), p. 19. Declaring security to be the government's number one area, Sentongo remarked that 27 percent of the proposed 1979-1980 budget would go toward dealing with this problem. *Budget Speech*, 1979, p. 12.

Destruction of the Physical Infrastructure. No issue points up the problem of mobilizing resources for public purposes more clearly than that of rebuilding Uganda's physical infrastructure. Foreign exchange earnings for central government purposes and improved cash incomes for the country's smallholder majority both depend upon the ability to transport cash crops. The country's existing fleet of lorries was decimated by misuse during the Amin years and by military appropriation during the liberation war. Uganda's road system bears visible signs of the failure to invest in its maintenance for nearly a decade. The present Uganda government has no detailed information on how many lorries it can mobilize for delivering seeds, food, and medical supplies where needed (a rough estimate is 1,600, a fifth of the number that plied the roads in 1970), nor does it have any clear idea on how many are needed. Trucks recently imported into the country have been looted and cannibalized for spare parts or, alternatively, sent illicitly across one of the country's borders in a highly profitable foreign currency transaction.

Even if corruption and political paralysis were not a factor, the government of Uganda is in no position to mobilize the trucks or maintain the roads to get supplies where they are urgently needed. The situation is the same with respect to rail transport. The real snag, therefore, is not so much the lack of infrastructure as the incapacity of government to mobilize available resources to meet critical short-term requirements. This incapacity to mobilize resources has the effect of further weakening the government's ability to govern. Consequently, the basic issue for foreign donors is less that of whether the missing vehicles and equipment can be replaced than whether the vicious downward spiral can be broken between government illegitimacy and the inability to deliver needed goods and services.

Economic Distortions and Altered Economic Values. The extensiveness of the black market, particularly in the urban areas, is a heritage of a decade in which normal

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"The Carter administration missed an opportunity to become Zimbabwe's closest ally, failing to appreciate that peace and stability in southern and central Africa rest on the maintenance of an economically strong Zimbabwe under pragmatic, conciliatory leadership."

Zimbabwe: Time Running Out

BY RICHARD W. HULL

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NINETEEN eighty was probably the most momentous year in the long history of Zimbabwe's people. A cease-fire at the close of 1979 ended a bitter seven-year civil war that left more than 20,000 dead, nearly 100,000 wounded, and twice that number homeless. Most rural schools and clinics lay in ruins and the economy neared collapse in the wake of international trade boycotts and the disruptions of guerrilla warfare.

In early March, after three days of remarkably free, peaceful and fair national elections, the guerrilla leader Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union/Patriotic Front (ZANU/PF) found themselves ruling a nation by popular mandate. They won Zimbabwe, in the end, not from the barrel of a gun but through the ballot box. Mugabe, a taciturn 56-year old Roman Catholic ascetic intellectual, who avoids tobacco and alcohol, became the first Marxist in African history to be freely elected as a head of government. To the surprise of even the most astute observers, he secured a broad mandate. His movement secured 63 percent of the 2.7 million African votes and therefore won 57 of the 80 black seats in the House of Assembly—in other words, an absolute majority.

Ominously, Zanu/PF, with its overwhelmingly Shona ethnic composition, won less than 10 percent of the vote of the Ndebele, who comprise about 16 percent of the population. The father of Zimbabwean nationalism, Joshua Nkomo, and his Ndebele-based Zimbabwe African Peoples Union/Patriotic Front (Zapu/PF) obtained only 24 percent of the popular vote and 20 legislative seats. Bishop Abel Muzorewa trailed with only 3 seats and, with Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, was politically obliterated.

The British colonial Governor, Lord Soames, immediately designated Robert Mugabe as Prime Minister and asked him to form a new government under African majority rule. Mugabe wisely put together a representative multiracial and multiethnic 23-member Cabinet. The rival Zapu/Patriotic Front was given four portfolios, including Home Affairs for Joshua Nkomo. Prominent whites became ministers of Commerce and Industry, and Agriculture. Lieutenant General Peter Walls, leader of the Rhodesian Army during the war, was appointed commander of the armed forces. A Methodist clergyman, Reverend Canaan Banana, was selected to serve in the largely ceremonial position of President. Rarely in world history have so many mutually antagonistic groups freely welded themselves into a single coalition government.

Not surprisingly, few observers ventured to predict a bright future for the beleaguered nation. On the positive side, the new country was blessed with highly educated multiracial talent. For example, 30 of Mugabe's close associates held doctoral degrees from American universities, and many more held degrees from British institutions. With that assurance, Great Britain, the former colonial overlord, gave Zimbabwe its independence on April 18, 1980, in an action that marked the conclusion of nine decades of white rule.

Few African leaders have been blessed with such a dazzling array of human and economic resources at independence. All the elements were there for the creation of a prosperous, multiracial and multiethnic democracy. But all the elements were also there for a racial and tribal bloodbath and the emergence of a modern totalitarian state. The task before the new Prime Minister was formidable: Mugabe had to undertake an incredible balancing act. Zimbabwe's factions, if not orchestrated properly, could cause a political eruption so violent that it could destroy the very national fabric of Zimbabwe and embroil all southern Africa in a racial, ethnic and ideological holocaust. "Reconciliation" became the theme for 1980, beginning with the armed forces, the body entrusted with maintaining the security under which economic and social progress must be achieved.

FORGING A NATIONAL ARMY

Throughout 1980, Zimbabwe suffered continuous waves of crime and public lawlessness. The country needed a degree of peace and stability conducive to foreign investment and aid sufficient to staunch the flight of sorely needed white farmers and technicians. The most serious short-term problem was welding the armed forces of the two former guerrilla movements and the old white-dominated Rhodesian army into a national armed force. The Zanu army, even more

than its Zapu counterpart, was basically a ragtag bush guerrilla force. But both Zanu and Zapu had to adapt to professional conventional soldiery. Moreover, not all the guerrillas could be utilized by the considerably smaller peacetime professional army.

Fortunately, those selected for retraining (all under British army contract) responded exceedingly well. The others had to be demobilized and assimilated into the civilian society and economy at a time of high youth unemployment. After independence, more than 33,000 veterans were crowded into "assembly points" to await resettlement. Inevitably, these internment camps became pressure cookers and were used by the impatient former guerrillas as bases for attacks on neighboring populations. In July, Mugabe renewed the emergency police powers that had first been invoked by the white Rhodesian government in 1964. Two months later, the government began to disarm the veterans, dismantle the camps, and resettle these disaffected nationalists near the country's major urban centers, particularly around Salisbury, the national capital, and Bulawayo. The civilian population was alarmed by the presence of so many frustrated, poorly educated, nonskilled and undisciplined people.

From the start, Mugabe's task of integrating the guerrilla armies was complicated by the assassination in late 1979 of his charismatic commander, Josiah Tongogara, who strongly favored the unification of the two forces. Reconciliation between the white officers and the guerrillas became even more difficult after the dismissal in late September, 1980, of Lieutenant General Peter Walls, the white commander. Since then, there has been no permanent overall commander. Josiah Tungamirai, commander of the guerrilla wing, has had problems in training his men and has turned to expatriate British advisers for assistance.

THE SEARCH FOR ETHNIC AND POLITICAL CONSENSUS

Even more difficult for Mugabe is the reconciliation of the disparate ethnic groups, complicated by their strongly political complexion. To begin with, the national elections were ethnically tinged, with Ndebele/Kalangas voting for Joshua Nkomo and his Zapu/Patriotic Front, and the Shona/Karangas for Robert Mugabe and his Zanu/PF. The former are based in the west around the city of Bulawayo and the latter are based in the east, threatening a geopolitical bifurcation of the nation.

The 30-member central committee of Zanu-PF, renamed the National Union party, in many respects now governs the nation. But only two members are Ndebele. The National Union party controls the television and the radio networks and has used the electronic media as a political weapon against Nkomo's Patriotic Front. By December, 1980, it was trying to control the press by forcing the South African-based Argus chain to sell its majority holdings to the government.

Mugabe and Nkomo have personally made efforts to soften interparty rivalry. Thus in late July, Nkomo delivered a very conciliatory speech in Bulawayo, calling for national unity. But both men are constantly challenged by more radical and impatient subordinates. Under Edgar Tekere, the rabidly anti-Nkomo secretary-general of Zanu/PF, an effort was initiated to create a one-party state in Zimbabwe, based on vague concepts of scientific socialism along Marxist lines.

Interparty rivalry erupted violently in Bulawayo in November. After Finance Minister Enos Nkala called for vigilante anti-Nkomo groups, Nkomo's former guerrillas launched a shooting confrontation that left 58 dead and more than 500 wounded, mostly innocent bystanders. The confrontation had both ethnic and political overtones and constituted a severe challenge to the fragile coalition government.

To nearly everyone's surprise, the newly formed national army restored order—a testimony to the successful process of formal military integration. But within days, the Prime Minister bowed to pressure from his party subordinates and arrested nine senior members of the Patriotic Front for "political acts." Nkomo was outraged, because as Home Minister he is technically head of the police. On the other hand, Mugabe's appointed Minister of State Security controls the security branch, a vestige of colonial days. Local elections that same month further entrenched the two antagonistic parties in their respective regions, almost as if new battle lines had been drawn.

There has been a steady erosion in the influence of Nkomo and his Patriotic Front in the decision-making process at the center of government in Salisbury. Concurrently, party politics have become increasingly polarized along ethnic lines. In early January, 1981, Mugabe removed Nkomo as Minister of Home Affairs, thus depriving him of control over the national police. Some observers began to question whether a true coalition government still existed. Moreover, under former Prime Minister Ian Smith's leadership, whites had become politically apathetic and disillusioned, and their power steadily receded at all levels of government.

In some respects, Mugabe's greatest threat came from the radical ideologues in his own party, particularly Edgar Tekere, who as Minister of Manpower became less patient with the slow pace of Africanization, nationalization and socialism. Tekere opposed any accommodation with Nkomo and the former white power structure. Indeed, many people in Zanu/PF believed that Mugabe was too soft on their former oppressors. Ironically, the Prime Minister's greatest protection became the continuing presence of

white economic and military expertise. The very power structures that sought to destroy Mugabe during the years of guerrilla insurgency were now struggling to keep their pragmatic, moderate and conciliatory black Prime Minister in a position of authority. Without the presence of Mugabe, they believed, Zimbabwe as a multiracial nation might very well collapse.

In early August, Tekere was arrested for murdering a white farmer. He was acquitted in November after a short trial, when the white judge was overruled by two black assessors, who (under the prevailing Roman Dutch legal system) served in place of a jury. The assessors held that although Tekere may indeed have killed the farmer, he was protected from prosecution, ironically, by a law enacted under the former white Rhodesian government to shield Cabinet ministers from criminal charges based on actions to counter "terrorism."

Tekere's inflammatory rhetoric in the past had won him points among the restless Shona population. Thus Mugabe, instead of attacking the third-ranking member of his own party, wisely distanced himself from the judiciary and its decision. The facts of the case stood for themselves, and in the course of the trial and its aftermath, Tekere lost a measure of respect and credibility. When Mugabe sacked Nkomo as Home Minister, he also removed Tekere from his Cabinet position.

The Bulawayo massacre had tested the unity of the army and the resolve of Mugabe and Nkomo to work together. The Tekere shooting incident tested the unity of Mugabe's own party, Zanu/PF, and his ability to lead it. Through patience and shrewd diplomacy Mugabe weathered both exceedingly well. But after the removal of Nkomo and Tekere it became less certain whether he could rally the nation on the sheer strength of his personality and administration. Both Nkomo and Tekere enjoy considerable popularity among their own people.

The Prime Minister recognized, above all, the impossibility of economic reconstruction without the short-term presence of whites and without trade with the industrialized West. When he lived in Mozambique, he learned from his protégé, Samora Machel, its Marxist President, to temper rhetoric and actions. Machel's radical posturing in the early stages of Mozambique's independence precipitated the flight of nearly a quarter million skilled Portuguese and their sorely needed capital. Mozambique's economy was left in shambles and everyone suffered.

Throughout 1980, race relations were remarkably peaceful, with a high degree of interracial cooperation and goodwill. Surprisingly, relations between whites and blacks were more cordial than relations among the various African ethnic groups. The white-dominated civil service and the military remained loyal to the new government; whites were depoliticized and were consequently perceived as less threatening.

Nevertheless, not all whites were prepared to live with the new regime. In the closing months of 1980, between 1,500 and 1,900 Europeans a month were leaving Zimbabwe. White emigration was accelerating, but not at a rate seriously damaging to the economy. Though semiskilled and youthful professionals were departing in record numbers, middle-aged and elderly owners and managers of vital industries and farms remained, especially those with long-term fixed assets.

In Zimbabwe, 1981 opened with approximately 210,000 whites living nervously among more than seven million Africans. The legal structure of racial discrimination had been dismantled, but white privilege and a neocolonialist ambience persisted in many areas. Mugabe still honored the pre-independence constitution that guaranteed 20 seats for whites in the 100-seat House of Assembly.

White farmers remain crucial to the physical survival and economic recovery of all Zimbabweans, because the country is heavily dependent on their large-scale commercial farms. Seventy percent of Zimbabwe's basic food needs are supplied by white farmers; half of the country's 82 million acres of agricultural land are owned by whites, who make up less than three percent of the population. More precisely, 4,500 farmers and estate-owning multinational corporations account for more than 85 percent of Zimbabwe's agricultural output and nearly half its export earnings.

Since the European conquest nine decades ago, land has been the central issue around which nearly all racial and political problems revolve. Africans and Europeans have been locked in a bitter struggle for the best land and, until 1980, the Europeans invariably won. Consequently, African rural areas are much more densely populated, often eroded, and with a less hospitable climate. Thus the Africans are increasingly less able to feed themselves.

For years, Robert Mugabe has called for the nationalization and collectivization of land. In the Commissariat Lectures (1977) guerrilla trainees were told by their instructor that:

> No person has [the] right to private ownership of land and minerals. Land hunger was one of the main objectives for the freedom struggle, and certainly is the inspiration of peasants who have rallied behind the movement. We state categorically that ZANU will dismantle the white farms and base its effort for increased production on an entirely new socialist arrangement. An economic institution such as the white-owned plantations . . . could not be sustained in an independent African state, even of the neo-colonial variety.[1]

[1]"Political Education in ZANU," *Zimbabwe News*, vol. 10 no. 1 (1978), pp. 57-58.

Every member of the movement, claims Zanu, received this message personally, on tape or in written form and Prime Minister Mugabe is under enormous pressure to fulfill that commitment. Yet how can this be done without killing the white goose that is laying the golden eggs? Mugabe will have to convince his land-hungry "comrades" that this process will take years and can only be approached in stages. To begin, some suggest that nearly one-third of the white farmers are marginal and inefficient and will sooner or later abandon their lands or sell out to the multinationals or to the government. But where will Zimbabwe's financially distressed government obtain the capital for land acquisition?

The United States and Great Britain now refuse to honor aid commitments made during the Gerald Ford and Harold Wilson administrations. Millions of acres of vacant park and forest land and farms abandoned during the war could be nationalized and reconstituted as state collectives with little public outcry. And certainly the land acquisition program is already under way, though at a very modest pace.

But the failure of rapid collectivization in Tanzania and Mozambique has made it painfully clear that many years, extensive reeducation, and enormous infusions of capital will be required before such collectives can be fully productive and competitive with the private sector. White Agricultural Minister Denis Norman contends that there are 11.6 million acres of unused or underutilized land formerly reserved for whites. Perhaps the program should begin there.

THE PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Zimbabwe's dynamically capitalistic agricultural, industrial and mining sectors—and their enormous potential, given capital infusions—have been more responsible than anything else for transforming Mugabe from an uncompromising ideological revolutionary to a consummate pragmatist. By third world standards, Zimbabwe is blessed with an extremely sophisticated, industrialized and diversified export sector. It is fabulously rich in such vital minerals as copper, asbestos, gold, high-grade chromium, nickel, iron and coal.

Neighboring Zambia and Zaire have drawn heavily on Zimbabwean coal to operate their own copper mines, and the Western industrialized nations rely on them for chrome. Over the last half decade, Zimbabwe has exported vital grain supplies to starving populations in Zambia and Zaire. It also exports tobacco, cotton, sugar and meat and is self-sufficient in many basic manufactured goods. Many Zimbabwean industries, particularly mining, are controlled from the Republic of South Africa. Since colonial days, Zimbabwe has enjoyed a preferential trade agreement with South Africa, and more than 70 percent of the country's manufactured goods and minerals either pass through South Africa or are destined for South Africa. Trade links with South Africa remain strong even though diplomatic relations have been severed.

Under black majority rule, Zimbabwe offers enormous scope for overseas aid, trade and investment. Prime Minister Mugabe has done as much as any leader in Africa to attract foreigners. To calm white fears, he has publicly retracted his demands for the outright confiscation of private lands and enterprises. He will also allow foreign capital to be repatriated after two years and up to 50 percent of after-tax profits to go to overseas shareholders.

Still, the task of economic reconstruction is enormous and the government estimates that recovery alone will cost $450 million, with long-term development plans requiring $4 billion. Despite his Marxist philosophy, Mugabe has shunned economic aid from the Soviet Union. During the war, much of his military support came from the People's Republic of China, while Nkomo's emanated from his long-time Russian allies. This should provide great opportunities for Western involvement in Zimbabwe's development.

Yet, surprisingly, the Western capitalist nations have not been enthusiastically receptive to Mugabe's generous overtures. Little foreign investment has come into the country since independence, and consequently Zimbabwe is suffering from a shortage of foreign exchange. In August, Mugabe went to Washington, D.C., to ask the United States to fulfill its 1977 Anglo-American pledge of $1 billion spread out over five years. President Jimmy Carter balked and even rejected Secretary of State Edmund Muskie's proposal for a $300-million three-year assistance effort. Instead, President Carter asked Congress for a paltry $30 million for fiscal 1981. Bitterly disappointed, Mugabe returned to Zimbabwe to face a projected budget deficit of $699 million.

Although Mugabe, the Marxist, failed to win the confidence of America's politicians, bankers and busi-

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Richard W. Hull has traveled extensively in Africa since 1961 under a Fulbright-Hays Fellowship and grants from the New York State Department of Education and New York University. In 1974, he wrote, produced, and narrated for CBS television a 47-part series entitled "African Civilizations," which was broadcast in this country, Canada, and Africa. He is the author of numerous books, including *Modern Africa: Change and Continuity* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980), *African Cities and Towns before the European Conquest* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), and *Southern Africa Civilizations in Conflict* (New York: New York University, forthcoming).

"After 15 years, the Mobutu regime appears on the verge of collapse, but it has appeared thus for a considerable time."

Mobutu's Zaire: Permanently on the Verge of Collapse?

By Thomas Turner

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NOVEMBER, 1980, marked the 15th anniversary of Mobutu Sese Seko's regime in Zaire, making that regime one of the longest-lived in Africa.* However, sheer longevity might be one of the regime's most positive traits. The Zairian "revolution" announced so proudly in 1965-1966 and elaborated over the next few years lay in tatters. In terms of economic independence, administrative efficiency, military capability and the well-being of the population, the situation was disastrous.

By late 1980, the Zairian government was publicly conceding that its "number one priority" was meeting the country's staggering debt payments to Western creditors. The United States State Department estimated Zaire's total external debt, as of 1980, at $6.4 billion. The partly rescheduled payments for 1980 had been made; the $550 million in debt payments to Western governments and private institutions that year represented 27 percent of the country's revenue from its mineral exports. Scheduled payments for 1981 would come to $850 million, clearly beyond Zaire's ability to pay; thus a further rescheduling would be necessary.

Zaire's Finance Minister Namwisi Ma Koyi blamed Zaire's financial difficulties on "a vicious circle" resulting from "the sudden reversal of copper prices in 1974-1975."[1] However, much of the responsibility for the disastrous debt situation fell on the Zairian leadership. During the 1970's, the country had embarked on a series of costly projects of doubtful utility, bought from Western contractors. These included the hydroelectric power plant at Inga (west of Kinshasa), a 1,000-mile power line to transmit Inga's power to the Shaba copper belt, a nationwide satellite and microwave transmission system that was not working (as of this writing), and luxurious skyscrapers housing the "Voice of Zaire," the "World Trade Center," a minerals-marketing board, and so on. A foreign observer labeled this category of projects as *"coopération-corruption,"* meaning that an essential element in their approval had been alleged kickbacks to high government officials.[2]

The growing concentration of political and economic decision-making meant that

> the intermediaries for the large foreign investors are no longer members of the administration or even the specialized ministries. Decisions are taken directly by a small group of advisers clustered around the presidency, which duplicate the work of the ministries and hold effective power.[3]

These new intermediaries and the President himself must be held accountable for the lavish projects that contributed so heavily to Zaire's international debt.

While Namwisi is correct in attributing a share of Zaire's recent difficulties to the cycles of copper prices, this explanation fails to analyze Zaire's overdependence on copper (and a few other minerals like cobalt and diamonds). In 1958, agriculture accounted for 41 percent of Zaire's exports, and the country easily fed itself. Between 1960 and 1965, agricultural exports fell sharply, presumably because of disorder in many parts of the country. But when order was restored after the 1965 coup, agricultural production should have rebounded. Instead, it continued to shrink. By 1974, agriculture accounted for only 11 percent of exports, and by 1977, food imports had reached $300 million per year. The continuing decline apparently reflected neglect, low prices for producers, and a series of ill-advised policy choices, including the 1973 seizure of a wide range of economic enterprises, including most commercial businesses, most plantations, and construction and transportation firms owned by Belgians, Portuguese, Greeks and other foreigners (but not Americans). Some of these firms were engaged in smuggling and most probably exported currency illegally; collectively, they were seen to block the rise of a Zairian commercial class.

Much of the confusion and abuse that followed was due to the absence of any clear legal framework for

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*This article is based primarily on research undertaken under a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities to Professor Crawford Young and myself. Neither the NEH nor Professor Young is responsible for the interpretations contained herein.

[1] *Wall Street Journal,* September 26, 1980.

[2] My interview, Lubumbashi, November, 1978.

[3] J.P. Peemans, "The Social and Economic Development of Zaire since Independence: An Historical Outline," *African Affairs,* vol. 74, April, 1975, p. 162.

"Zairianization" (as the takeover process was known). In the weeks following the announcement, contradictory instructions were issued by various government offices. The Political Bureau of the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), the Ministerial Council, and the Legislative Council met jointly and decided that although some "strategic" agro-industrial and commercial units would become public corporations, the major plantations and ranches and most larger commercial businesses would go to the members of these three organs, notably to Mobutu. When the public reaction was negative, Mobutu reversed himself, establishing a procedure allowing aspirant businessmen to introduce their candidacies at various levels of the administration. In all, some 2,000 businesses were distributed, mostly to members of the governing elite. Mobutu himself was the leading beneficiary.

Within a few months, the full scope of the disaster of Zairianization became clear: the dislocation of commercial circuits, the shortages of goods, the layoffs of employees, tax evasion, the abandonment of businesses.

Instead of turning back, however, Mobutu plunged forward, into the "radicalization of the revolution," apparently inspired by his visit to China and North Korea. "Radicalization" included the nationalization of commerce and the mobilization of agricultural brigades to relieve the food shortage. Employees of the party or state were to turn over their Zairianized businesses to the state, and to confine their activities to agriculture. In its application, however, "radicalization" was transformed from an attack on the Zairianized businesses to an assault on the primarily Belgian-owned industrial sector dating from the colonial era. These businesses were to be administered on behalf of the state by delegates-general, drawn from the ranks of the old-line politicians. Thus radicalization extended the disruptive effects of "Zairianization" into virtually all spheres of the economy. When other factors intervened—including the Angola civil war and the consequent closing of the Benguela railroad, the fall of the copper price, and the exhausting of foreign exchange reserves—the disaster was complete. Most Zairianized and "radicalized" properties were subsequently returned to their former owners, in whole or in part, but rather the worse for wear. The damage was not only economic but political as well; the legitimacy of the Mobutist regime was badly eroded by the untrammeled greed displayed by major political figures.

Blatant corruption is, in fact, an outstanding characteristic of the regime and has been roundly denounced by Mobutu, who has declared that "in Zaire, everything is for sale." This corruption, it must be stressed, goes far beyond the proverbial lubrication that makes the machine work. It amounts to massive confiscation of public wealth and includes Mobutu himself. *Le Monde Diplomatique* recently estimated that one-third of Zaire's national revenue was in one way or the other at the disposition of the President.[4] The process repeats itself at each lower level of the government and the party until, at the lowest levels, ordinary gendarmes, typists and schoolteachers extort modest sums from the rest of the population.

The Mobutu regime dates from the 1965 coup, but it is a military regime only in a special sense; Mobutu generally has attempted to limit the political role of military officers other than himself. Although the regime relies on the military to keep it in power, the military is the weakest element of the ruling coalition, as its performance whenever it is called into action demonstrates.[5] In 1964-1965, the Zairian army was unable to defeat the ragtag Mulelist insurgents until it was reinforced by white mercenaries and Belgian paratroops. Despite large-scale military aid during the intervening period, Zaire's best units were mauled in Angola in 1975. While the latter defeat might be explained by the high quality of the Cuban forces with the MPLA, there was no such excuse for the Zairian inability to handle the "Tigers" of the *Front de Libération Nationale du Congo* who invaded Shaba Region in 1977 and 1978; the invaders were repulsed by French and Belgian paratroopers and Moroccan army regulars. After the Shaba invasions, foreign military aid from France and Belgium followed a familiar pattern: new units were trained so that they would not be "contaminated" by soldiers who had failed.

In any case, the belief that the problem of the Zairian military was essentially one of training was short-sighted. There is considerable evidence that Mobutu's method of controlling the armed forces by "divide and rule" is a major factor in Zaire's continuing military ineptitude. The heads of the various services have been responsible directly to the President. Factions of officers—defined in terms of the branch of service, ethnic or regional identity, levels of training, generation gaps, and so on—are played off against one another. Mobutu clearly tolerates inept performance as the price of personal security.

On several occasions, political considerations have outweighed professionalization. In 1975, after Mobutu expelled the American ambassador, those condemned to death in the so-called *coup monté et manqué* included three generals, a colonel and two majors, reportedly among the most able in the armed forces. Early in 1978, eight officers were executed (along with five civilians) for what Mobutu termed a

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[4]Barry Cohen, "L'ébauche d'une stragégie occidentale," *Le Monde Diplomatique,* July, 1978.

[5]Thomas Turner, "The Zairian Military: Backbone of the Regime and its Achilles' Heel," paper delivered to the annual meeting of the African Studies Association in Los Angeles, October 31-November 3, 1979.

plot to sabotage the economy and drive him from office. Again, these were mainly (if not exclusively) younger and better educated officers.

The executions reflected ethnic and regional as well as generational cleavages. Those eliminated in 1975 were mainly Tetela and others from the East Kasai and Kivu Regions; those eliminated in 1978 included many Luba from East Kasai. Reportedly, Mobutu relies more and more on officers from his home region of Equateur and from adjacent areas of Bandundu and the Haut-Zaire Regions, and has restricted recruitment from other areas, thus reducing the legitimacy of the regime from the standpoint of the people from those areas.

In 1980, Mobutu tried to promote the institutionalization and professionalization of the armed forces, removing himself from the day-to-day supervision of their activities. In January, he named General Babia, a relatively young and highly trained officer from Equateur, to become Minister of Defense, a post he hitherto held himself. Evidently, the results of this experiment were not satisfactory; in August, Mobutu resumed control of the Defense Ministry, to supervise personally the reorganization of the Zairian army, with Belgian, French and Chinese help.[6]

Zaire's single political party, like the armed forces, has been the object of endless structural tinkering. The high point in the development of the Mobutist party-state occurred in 1974, when a new constitution declared the MPR to be the sole institution of the country; in other words, the ministries, the National University, and all other public institutions were specialized institutions of the party.[7] The MPR was everywhere, officially; however, observers noted that in becoming omnipresent the party had in fact disappeared, in that it no longer constituted a distinctive body charged with carrying out specific tasks, like political education.[8] This judgment was confirmed by MPR Executive Secretary Kithima bin Ramazani, who declared in 1978 that the fusion of state and party had "as an unfortunate consequence the progressive extinction of the activities of the party to the profit of those of the state." This in turn supposedly was leading to

> the appearance . . . of ideological theories and practices contrary to the spirit and principles of Mobutism, the crumbling of the militantism of the *cadres,* their cynical opportunism, and the demobilization of the popular masses . . . .[9]

While this diagnosis was oversimplified, Mobutu proceeded as though it were valid, creating an executive secretariat in February, 1978, to revive the activities of the MPR. Presumably still dissatisfied with the performance of the party, he decided in August, 1980, to create a new, 120-member Central Committee of the MPR, which replaced the Political Bureau as the "organ of conception, of guidance, and of decision." Once again, structural tinkering was regarded as the cure for a problem whose roots were deeper.

Some reforms were advanced in response to external pressures. In 1977, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Western countries to "liberalize" his regime, Mobutu held elections for urban zone (commune) councils, for the National Legislative Council, and for the MPR Political Bureau, as well as the presidential election due because his seven-year term was ending. The other elections were surprising: urban zone councils had been abolished, national legislators had been elected to five-year terms only two years before, and Political Bureau members always had been appointed by the President. Mobutu claimed that one of the purposes of the elections was institution-building; if this were so, it was curious that the procedure bypassed the MPR, which was not permitted to screen or endorse candidates.

Particularly in the elections for the National Legislative Council and the Political Bureau, wealthy politicians, including former Mobutu intimates Nendaka and Bomboko, spent vast amounts on businessmen with no prior political experience. In contrast, the eleven Political Bureau members appointed by the President in 1977 included at least seven university graduates; together with the handful of graduates among the elected members, these formed a coherent bloc (according to a member interviewed) vis-à-vis the businessmen and "old politicians." Once again, however, the results seem not to have pleased the Founder-President of the MPR; in February, 1980, he announced the abolition of the system of electing Political Bureau members and members of the Executive Secretariat (innovations dating from 1977 and 1978 respectively). At the same time, he announced that all constitutional provisions exempting himself from legal requirements to which other Zairians were subject had been abolished. Lest anyone think that this change, or the release of political prisoners, meant liberalization, Mobutu insisted that the MPR would remain the sole party, and that no return to multipartyism was conceivable.

Beneath the continually changing structures, the regime remained heavily patrimonial. Success depended on the favor of the ruler. Rarely was disgrace

[6] *Africa Report,* March-April, 1980; *ibid.,* November-December, 1980.

[7] Aristide Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966).

[8] Thomas Turner, "Chiefs, Bureaucrats and the M.P.R. of Zaire," paper delivered to the annual meeting of the African Studies Association in San Francisco, November, 1975; a later version appears under the same title in Kay Lawson, ed., *Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).

[9] Kithima bin Ramazani, "Recueil des directives aux secrétaires permanents," Kinshasa, 1978.

ever permanent; thus, former political exiles Kamitatu and Kashamura returned to favor in 1979-1980, the former becoming a minister, the latter an ambassador.

In contrast, former Minister Mungul-Diaka fled the country during 1980 and surfaced in Brussels as head of the Council for the Liberation of the Congo. This Council brought together five organizations, including the Congolese National Liberation Front (FLNC), responsible for the two invasions of Shaba, the People's Revolutionary party (whose guerrillas still were active in mountainous southeastern Kivu), and the Progressive Congolese Students. Even though the Council was prepared either to fight or to talk, it was not clear whether it would prove any more effective than any other exile group or whether Mumgul-Diaka would remain in exile instead of being coaxed back to Kinshasa by Mobutu.

Mobutu is apparently concerned about the activity of the exiles—witness the attempt of his security police to force dissident Joseph Nsele onto a plane back to Kinshasa in January, 1980. Amnesty International-Belgium, which reported the incident, said that Nsele remained at the airport for five weeks while Belgian authorities considered his request for asylum.[10]

Probably still more worrisome to the Mobutu regime is Jean Tshombe, son of the former Prime Minister. Living in exile since Mobutu came to power, Tshombe *fils* has been linked with the FLNC, for which he would provide far more prestigious leadership than former policeman Nathaniel Mbumba. Mobutu sent Yale Seti, the head of the security police (CND), to Lusaka, Zambia, to talk to Jean Tshombe, but no immediate results were apparent.[11]

Within the country, the popular attitude has been discouragement rather than rebellion, but there are signs that the popular mood may be changing. In January, 1978, members of a millenarian sect staged a brief insurrection in Kwilu Sub-region (scene of Mulele's insurrection in 1963-1964); they were brutally put down by the Zaire army and many people were killed.[12] And in March, 1980, university students went on strike against Mobutu's government, demanding higher scholarship grants. Defying a government order to end the walkout, the students rioted, burning buses and cars and barricading the streets. Hundreds of students, teachers, and workers were detained, and several students were murdered in custody, according to Amnesty International.

[10]*The New York Times,* January 22, 1980.

[11]*Guardian,* December 22, 1979.

[12]Diocese of Idiofa, *La Diocesaine d'Idiofa,* vol. 2, no 7 (January-April, 1978).

[13]*Africa Report,* July-August, 1980.

[14]U.S. Department of State, *Human Rights Reports,* 1979.

[15]F.S.B. Kazadi, "Politics of U.S. Foreign Assistance," *Africa Report,* May-June, 1980, p. 54.

Reports by Amnesty make it clear that although Mobutu is no Idi Amin, political oppression is growing. Hundreds of Zairians have been detained arbitrarily and jailed in remote camps in the jungle and bush; the most notorious of these is Ekafara in Equateur Region, reported to house between 400 and 500 detainees. Prisoners in these camps are frequently held in extremely poor conditions without ever being charged with a crime; and many die from torture and starvation.[13]

Perhaps more basic than political oppression are inadequate living standards. The United States Department of State has observed that

> most Zairians lack adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, access to education, transportation, or a job that pays a living wage, and their access to these necessities is diminishing.[14]

While some of these conditions are caused in part by external factors—falling copper prices and even drought—internal political factors are a more basic problem.

UNITED STATES SUPPORT

One reason, if not the only reason, for the persistence of the Mobutu regime in the face of demonstrated misgovernment is the population's perception that the regime is strongly supported abroad. Although much of the support has come in the form of investment or military aid from other sources—notably France, Belgium, Morocco and China—the United States is perceived as Mobutu's chief backer. Zaire increasingly poses a dilemma for American policymakers. Some members of the United States Congress have expressed concern over human rights violations, the misuse of American aid (notably, P.L. 480 rice), and the unpopularity of the Mobutu regime. The House of Representatives voted to end all military assistance to Zaire in 1980, as an expression of this concern; but the Senate reinstated the funds, reacting to pressure from President Jimmy Carter and United States business interests in Zaire. The two houses compromised in conference committee, reducing the assistance (intended primarily for spare parts and training for the Zairian air force) by 20 percent.[15]

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Thomas Turner has taught at the Université Libre du Congo in Kisangani, and at the Université Nationale du Zaire in Lubumbashi. His articles on Zairian politics have appeared in journals in Zaire, Belgium, and the United States, and in Guy Gran, ed., *Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment* (New York: Praeger, 1979) and Kay Lawson, ed., *Political Parties and Linkage* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). He is the coauthor, with Crawford Young, of a forthcoming book on Zaire under Mobutu.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON AFRICA

WHICH WAY IS SOUTH AFRICA GOING? *By Gwendolyn M. Carter.* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980. 162 pages, notes and index, $12.95.)

Gwendolyn Carter discusses various futures for South Africa, based on her extensive travel and knowledge of that country going back to 1948. Her latest visit in 1979 gave her the opportunity to reexamine the racial discrimination, the "homelands," and the African opposition to the policies of the South African government.

South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha has expressed the opinion "that the government must create far-reaching changes in the country's race relations if whites are to survive." The African opposition says, "We don't want our chains made more comfortable. We want them removed." These two statements make plain the difficulties facing South Africa. Carter concludes that "sooner or later the [urban black] people will succeed in securing the rights that will enable them to take their place as full citizens of an undivided South Africa."
O.E.S.

AFRICAN REALITIES. *By Kenneth L. Adelman.* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1980. 170 pages and index, $16.50.)

The political events that have shaken southern Africa in recent years are discussed by Kenneth Adelman in this well-written work. He takes the position that the "conflicts in Africa" must be seen in the context of a larger East-West rivalry and that United States policy ignores the larger implications of Cuban and Soviet support for the conflict in Southern Africa.

Adelman describes how late decolonization, disputed boundaries (some 28 thousand miles of them), poverty, wretched economies that have (in most cases) become more wretched since independence, and political instability will continue to deprive African peoples of any security. The failure of the Organization of African Unity to function effectively and the outside fueling of old quarrels also contribute to this lack of security. Adelman believes that the United States must consider its interests in Africa, including the American need for oil and critical raw materials, and must take steps to protect its interests. He feels that the problems of southern Africa can be solved only by means of drastic new approaches; some anticipated changes will take place "in a manner foreseeable today" but "truly fundamental and massive change" may take place, influenced by some major events unforeseen at the present time.
O.E.S.

ISLAM IN TROPICAL AFRICA. *Edited by J.M. Lewis.* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980. 310 pages and index, $25.00 cloth, $10.95 paper.)

This is a scholarly study of the history and sociology of the diverse people (some 60 million of them) that make up Muslim Africa south of the Sahara.
O.E.S.

SCANDINAVIANS IN AFRICA: GUIDE TO MATERIALS RELATING TO GHANA IN THE DANISH NATIONAL ARCHIVES. *Compiled by Joe Reindorf, edited by J. Simensen.* (Oslo: Univesitets Forlagen, 1980. 140 pages, $13.00 paper.)

This is a guide to the material and papers available in the Danish National Archives and covers the history of the dealings of Danish companies and government with the Gold Coast.
O.E.S.

THE RIDDLE OF VIOLENCE. *By Kenneth Kaunda, edited by Colin M. Morris.* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1981. 184 pages, $9.95.)

An ardent practitioner of nonviolence, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia recounts his struggles to condone the armed struggle for Zimbabwe's independence, in which Zambia was a base for guerrilla forces and the victim of Rhodesian air strikes. He says, "I ended up supporting armed struggle in Zimbabwe because I could no longer believe that anything is preferable to the use of force. . . . If one must make that terrible choice, I do believe that chains are worse than bayonets."
O.E.S.

AFRICAN UPHEAVALS SINCE INDEPENDENCE. *By Grace Stuart Ibingira.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. 349 pages and notes, $22.50.)

Ibingira believes that the constant tumult in African states since independence lies partly in the "manifest defects of the colonial legacy to each of these states. Most notable was the total failure . . . to combine within a colony, ethnic groups with compatible characteristics. . . ." Another basic cause of instability, as she sees it, "has been the [former colonies'] strong preference for autocratic rule. . . ."
O.E.S.

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA

(Continued from page 100)

decision to sell Morocco $232.5 million in helicopters, F5E jet fighters, and other aircraft, all to be paid for by Saudi Arabia. The sale was rationalized as a signal of United States support for King Hassan, which would permit him to negotiate from strength with Polisario. King Hassan indicated no interest in such negotiations.

In 1980 also, while the United States was negotiating with Somalia over access to the base at Berbera, the Somali-Ethiopian conflict flared, with between 6,000 and 8,000 regular Somali troops invading Ethiopia. The Ethiopians repelled this new attack and by the end of 1980 they were launching air attacks on Somalia's border towns in obvious retaliation.

The United States Congress authorized $40 million in arms sales to Somalia for 1980-1981, with the proviso that the United States would verify the fact that no regular Somali forces were in Ethiopia, a guarantee that the government has thus far been unable to provide. Pleading that they are defenseless against the Ethiopians, the Somalis anticipate broad United States support. Ethiopia vigorously protested to African and European states against this United States aid. The United States may be in danger of supporting a state whose annexationist claims on its neighbors are rejected by all other African states.

In 1978-1979 the United States also extended military assistance elsewhere: to Kenya, which fears Somalia's claims on its northern district; and to the Sudan (the only Muslim state supporting Egypt's accords with Israel), $135 million in aid in 1981, including $30 million in military credits, to which the House added $65 million for new jets. In the wake of Libyan offers of aid to Liberia's new and weak military government, the United States rushed in with several new offers of aid.

A by-product of Congress' decision to reduce the President's accountability to congressional committees on intelligence operations was the attempt during 1980 to remove the 1976 amendment authored by Democratic Senator Richard Clark of Iowa, which forbids military or paramilitary aid to forces in Angola. The House of Representatives defeated this move, but a more conservative Congress in 1981 will probably scrap the Clark amendment.

This new emphasis on strategic thinking did not, however, alter United States policy toward southern Africa, where the United States maintained sanctions on Rhodesia until a constitution agreeable to all parties was established. The Rhodesia/Zimbabwe policy was probably the single finest achievement of the Carter administration's Africa policy.

Throughout 1979, Republicans and Democrats in Congress had pressed the administration to end sanctions and recognize the new black government created by the "internal settlement," which left the whites in charge and the guerrilla armies in the wilderness, still fighting. In the reanimated cold war climate of 1979, the Carter administration was constantly attacked for supporting "Marxist-Leninist guerrillas." Continued United States support for the sanctions and pressures on all parties for a settlement gave Britain the leverage it needed to force an agreement.

THE CHOICES AHEAD

The United States will be facing decisions on a significant number of African issues in the coming years, and it is important to know how the new Reagan administration will respond. President Ronald Reagan and his top foreign policy advisers, including his National Security Adviser, Richard Allen, and his Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, have little interest in or knowledge about Africa. All the President's advisers, questioned about African policies, have stated unequivocally that they will be considered in terms of the cold war and East-West conflicts.[7] Chester Crocker, the new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, is an African specialist with somewhat more sensitive views, but he repeatedly criticized President Carter for his failure to consider United States strategic interests in Africa.

And two of the three members of the Reagan African transition team at the State Department suggested the prominence of the most right-wing elements of the Reagan following in African policy: John Carbaugh, an aide to Senator Jesse Helms, who sought consistently to end United States support for United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia, and Marion Smoak, who is a registered agent for the South African administrator-general of Namibia. Smoak was in charge of arranging future policy and staffing on Africa and the United Nations.

The orientation of President Reagan and his spokesmen also suggests a strong aversion to African Marxist regimes. Statements on Africa proclaim a repeated preference for countries with "free market economies."[8] Though Reagan spokesmen indicate the President's willingness to deal with Mugabe in Zimbabwe, his interest in Zimbabwe will be strongly affected by any Mugabe government measures of redistribution and land reform.

Several important African issues will require decisions in the near future. President Reagan's administration must decide whether to attempt to provide

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[7]See Richard Deutsch's interviews in "Reagan's African Perspectives," *Africa Report*, July-August, 1980, pp. 4-7.

[8]"A Position Statement on Africa," in *African Index*, November 24, 1980.

KENYA: AFRICA'S ODD MAN IN

(Continued from page 110)

economy, put in jeopardy when its neighbors close boundaries, when world commodity prices fall, or when tourists get nervous. Maize is the staple food of most Kenyans but in recent years, because of drought, Kenya has not been able to feed its own people and has had to import grains. Foreign aid has been extensive and generous and Kenya remains a donor's favorite. Yet the donors as well as voices within Kenya are calling for more equitable distribution of economic growth.

Kenya moved in 1980 to deal with some of these issues and contradictions. In exchange for the United States right to use facilities at the port of Mombasa, Washington agreed to provide Kenya with $40 million in surplus food and military sales credits for possible purchase of weapons. (Kenya's Air Force is lagging in equipment behind several of its neighbors.) Kenya with its superb athletes boycotted the Moscow Olympics and firmly opposed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. At home President Moi released the last of the political detainees, called for austerity measures in the light of new increases in oil prices, reshuffled the Cabinet after the 1979 elections to bring in a few new faces, and warned against possible political troublemakers. Two World Bank economists contend that Kenya was achieving redistribution with growth as citydwellers invested in agricultural improvements; to the critics, including Nairobi university students, Kenya's neocapitalism has become formally allied with Western imperialism. One had only to glance at the map to understand why two decades after independence Kenya remains Africa's odd man in. ■

MOBUTU'S ZAIRE: PERMANENTLY ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE?

(Continued from page 127)

Despite the many deficiencies of the Mobutu regime, it seemed to be the beneficiary of a contradiction in United States policy; a high administration official explained that cutting off support would mean the fall of Mobutu and "we don't do that sort of thing anymore." In other words, the Mobutu regime is receiving support in the name of noninterference.

The other main source of support—presumably less visible to Zairians outside elite circles—is the International Monetary Fund. The IMF has attempted to straighten out Zairian government finances but, like the American government, it has found itself a prisoner of the contradictions of its policies. In 1979, the IMF forced Mobutu to accept a West German principal director of the Bank of Zaire, Erwin Blumenthal. In November and December of that year, Blumenthal issued letters forbidding all credit and exchange facilities to 50 major Zairian companies, including those owned by relatives of the President and presidential allies. (Of the wealthiest businessmen, only Mobutu himself was spared.) This represented a direct challenge to the President, in that it demanded that he withhold financial privileges that helped ensure the loyalty of his principal allies. Without strong pressure from the IMF, there was little hope that Zaire's finances could be improved; with these measures and parallel action to straighten out the Finance Ministry and the Customs Service, Zaire's sovereignty would be compromised.

By 1980, Mobutu had apparently won.

> The tough Mr. Erwin Blumenthal left his job as chief IMF coordinator at the Bank of Zaire in despair, to be replaced by the too-gentle Mr. Mamadou Toure (also anxious to leave). In July, 1980, Mobuto [sic] wrote to the IMF asking that the (already depleted) IMF team at the Bank of Zaire be withdrawn.[16]

At the same time Mobutu asked for $1 billion from the fund's extended fund facility. Clearly, his indebtedness was providing him with leverage in dealing with his unenthusiastic Western backers.

After 15 years, the Mobutu regime appears on the verge of collapse, but it has appeared thus for a considerable time. In November, 1978, a Zairian professor asked rhetorically, "How long can a patient live with a fever of 105°?"[17] More than two years later, the question has lost none of its pertinence. ■

[16] *The Economist* (London), November 15, 1980.
[17] My interview, Kinshasa, November, 1978.

ZIMBABWE: TIME RUNNING OUT

(Continued from page 123)

nessmen, he had better luck with the Europeans. In November, Zimbabwe joined the Second Lomé Convention, which was signed by 9 European Economic Community (EEC) nations and 59 African, Caribbean and Pacific states. The beleaguered country may now request substantial development aid in the form of loans and grants and will gain access to European markets for its exports. The EEC will help Zimbabwe attract loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and will encourage private foreign investment and cofinancing.

CONCLUSION

Robert Mugabe has proved to be one of the most intelligent, reasonable and respected leaders on the continent, and Zimbabwe deserves more support from the West than it is receiving. By arbitration rather than dictation, Mugabe has guided Zimbabwe through the most critical ten months in its history. He

has managed to inspire remarkable loyalty from his former white enemies, and he has worked harder than any Zimbabwean leader since the days of King Lobengula in the 1890's to achieve mutual understanding and interracial cooperation.

Few third world countries are faced with such a complexity of problems and few have faced them with as much honesty and candor. The Carter administration missed an opportunity to become Zimbabwe's closest ally, failing to appreciate that peace and stability in southern and central Africa rest on the maintenance of an economically strong Zimbabwe under pragmatic, conciliatory leadership. That leadership is in place, but it desperately needs generous economic support for its survival.

The fragile nature of economic recovery has been revealed in labor unrest. In May, Mugabe had to contend with massive wildcat strikes, sitdowns and demonstrations in mines and factories and on agricultural estates. They ended only after the Prime Minister pleaded with the people to use the existing conciliation mechanisms. Independence touched off a revolution of rising expectations among African workers, who demanded a rapid closure of the enormous wage disparities that have historically existed between whites and blacks.

Mugabe opposed his colleagues, refusing to grant a $100-a-month wage floor for all workers, because he knew the economic consequences of a sudden explosion in wage scales. The escalating demands of African workers can be satisfied only by real economic growth, and that can only be achieved by support from the West. If the Western response remains halfhearted much longer, the Marxist Prime Minister may very well turn eastward toward the Communist bloc. In Zimbabwe, time is running out. ■

THE LIBERIAN COUP IN PERSPECTIVE

(Continued from page 105)

particular, was regarded as a "satisfied" group, since officers were recruited from leading Americo-Liberian families. Indeed, in 1965, the Liberian Chief of Staff was a Colonel George Washington from the village of Virginia.

The enlisted ranks were another story. Their wages and housing conditions were extremely inadequate, and they were frequently compelled—or tacitly allowed—to exploit the countryside to survive. The Whig leadership, however, had carefully orchestrated its game of ethnic stereotyping by segregating the Loma, Krahn, and other tribal recruits, assigning them to units and tasks peculiar to each group. Until the modernization program under Tolbert, enlisted men enjoyed only rudimentary literacy. Since they were normally posted to areas away from home, it was difficult for them to make common cause with civilian dissenters.

Why then did the military revolt against the civilian leadership? First of all, it must be recognized that the coup of April 12 did not involve a single officer. The 17 enlisted men who killed Tolbert and the other 25 men (mostly security personnel) involved in the coup were, moreover, all members of the Krahn and other southeastern tribal groups. No Loma, the largest ethnic contingent in the army, were involved. Indeed, it was a street expression that the Loma had had their chance to take over the weakened government after the 1979 rice riots but that they had faltered.

In retrospect, the army might have been a likely challenger to the Tolbert regime before April 12. Technical training programs in the United States and elsewhere had upgraded the educational level of the 6,000-man military force. Purchase of expensive military technology and hardware, moreover, was being handicapped by government corruption and the balance of payments problem. And to a certain extent, the Tolbert regime had contributed to the politicization of the military by using soldiers to put down dissent on university and school campuses and to break strikes of urban and agricultural workers. It was reliably reported that during the rice riots the military in Monrovia had refused to fire on the demonstrators because they sympathized with the plight of their own relatives and friends. It was the police who killed the demonstrators. Finally, there was evidence in the months preceding the coup that military personnel—both officers and noncommissioned officers—and civilian dissidents were pursuing parallel lines of protest.

There is no hard evidence, however, that the coup was a product of military-civilian conspiracy. Most PPP leaders, after all, were in the stockade awaiting the trial scheduled—in a perverse twist—for April 14, the anniversary of the rice riots. Nor, in the absence of an official version, is there evidence that the coup was anything other than a sporadic decision on the part of Master Sergeant Doe and his fellow Krahn. Indeed, rumors were rampant in the week preceding April 12 that the old guard of the True Whig party was preparing a preemptive coup during Tolbert's visit to Zimbabwe, where he would participate in the April 18 independence ceremonies. Actions taken by Speaker of the House Richard Henries, Attorney General Joseph Chesson and other hardliners suggested that the PPP leaders might be found guilty and executed before Tolbert returned from Zimbabwe.

Whatever the degree of prior planning, within a matter of hours the action of 17 enlisted men at the executive mansion brought the country completely under their control. Nowhere was the transfer of power challenged in any organized fashion. By the end of the day some 90 or more Tolbert officials had

been arrested, the 17 plotters had converted themselves into the People's Redemption Council (PRC) as the watchdog of the "revolution," and a new Cabinet had been named. In addition to the military officers assigned to the key ministries of defense and finance, the Cabinet consisted of civilians representing three distinct groups: leaders of the PAL/PPP, several leaders of MOJA, and a number of Tolbert officials who had earlier made a public commitment to reform. Many of the last named group had strong ties to the Tubman period, including Gabriel Tucker, the late Tubman's son-in-law, and Shad Tubman, Jr., who was called in as an adviser to the PRC.

TIME OF TROUBLES FOR THE PRC

Although the machineguns and battle dress in evidence everywhere in Monrovia left little doubt that the PRC was in control, it was equally apparent that it questioned its own success. After all, it was argued, how could the all-powerful and oppressive Whig aristocracy come crashing to a halt as the result of one single act? The PRC leaders seemed convinced that the surviving Whigs would call for and receive support from the Americans (who would want to protect their investments), from the Guineans (who had rescued Tolbert during the rice riots), from the Ivoriens (since President Felix Houphouet-Boigny's ward was married to Tolbert's son), or from the Nigerian and other OAU leaders who had voiced their shock with regard to Tolbert's murder.

The studiously cool American treatment of the Doe regime, the successful efforts to bar Doe and other Liberians from attending scheduled meetings of the OAU, of ECOWAS (the West African Economic Community), and other organizations reinforced the feeling that the Doe government was under international quarantine. Foreign aid and investment came to a halt. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank imposed harsh terms in providing money that would permit the government to meets its payrolls. And the quixotic broadcast from Abidjan by former Vice President Bennie Warner, who insisted that he was Tolbert's legal successor and called for an armed uprising, only intensified the regime's self-doubts.

It is against this background that one must evaluate the public mistreatment of the arrested officials and their wives, the systematic sacking of the residences of officials and the huge Masonic Temple on Mamba Point and, ultimately, the televised executions of 13 former officials on April 22. This event came after a most peremptory "trial" in which the accused were not given the benefit of counsel or access to personal or official records. The macabre circus atmosphere of the executions intensified the efforts of other African leaders and Western diplomats to isolate the Doe regime diplomatically and economically. The only international voices of support came from unaccustomed quarters—Libya, the Soviet Union, Cuba and Ethiopia.

To the surprise of outside observers, many Liberians—including some of the most reform minded—were not repelled by the displays of violence and even the executions on the beach. In fact, there was a certain symmetry in the post coup actions that replicated some of the reactive violence of previous Whig regimes in dealing with political dissent. Tolbert and the others killed on April 12 and April 22, for example, were dumped into a common grave not ten feet away from the common grave in which the victims of the rice riots had been unceremoniously deposited a year earlier.

COUP OR REFORM REVOLUTION?

The presumption of Liberia's leaders is that they constitute the vanguard of a reform revolution. The daily government communiqués end with the signature: "In the cause of the people, the struggle continues." Yet it is not clear whether the coup of April 12 was a dramatic first step in a revolution that will have far-reaching political, economic, social and cultural consequences, or whether it will be regarded in the future as a major event in which old patterns of behavior were interrupted but not destroyed and after which some of the same old groups would reinstate themselves.

The expectation of the tribal masses and the lower income Americo-Liberians is that April 12 was the beginning of a new order. The enthusiastic reaction to Doe personally as he toured the market stalls, the schools and other sectors of Monrovia reflected this. The pinnacle of power was held by one who was proud of his Krahn background, who spoke the more widely understood version of Liberian English, and whose ability to relate to the common people was not contrived. The instant entry, moreover, of persons of tribal or lower income Americo-Liberian backgrounds into the Cabinet, the judiciary, and the foreign service was patent evidence of a status reversal in society. On the other hand, even the surviving Americo-Liberian elites could take heart from the fact that the revolution —if that is what it was—was directed against an odious *system* rather than against an ethnic group. Thus, there was a tacit recognition that many Americo-Liberians had also suffered under the aristocratic Whig rule. Moreover, the constant exhortations on government radio and in the press urging people to avoid ethnic identifications and stereotyping would work to the advantage of the settler group as well as to individual tribal groups who had suffered discrimination.

In addition to a basic change in attitude towards ethnicity, there were dramatic status reversals. The two main bastions of settler supremacy, the True

Whig party and the Masonic Order, were destroyed, perhaps permanently. The social clubs or "crowds" in which the various competing factions of settler elite clustered were also disbanded. Those churches in which the clerical and lay leadership were synonymous with political leadership (Bennie Warner, for example, was the presiding bishop of the Methodist Church) were found to suffer at least diminished status. On the other hand, the traditional poro societies among the Gola, Mende and other groups might take on renewed vitality. And, of course, the military enjoys high status, and this is reflected in the new wage structure, military seizure of the OAU chalets and some recently completed housing estates, and the appearance of uniformed enlisted men in hotels and restaurants where their presence in the past would have been challenged.

There is one institution, however, whose liberation could be crucial in the fashioning of a genuinely new Liberian national identity and in developing innovative ways of coping with the crises of poverty, disease and ignorance—the educational system as a whole, and the University of Liberia in particular. Once regarded as little better than a second-rate high school, the university's faculty, library and physical plant have undergone a dramatic transformation in the past decade. Under its most recent president, Mary Sherman, it has evidenced an interest in excellence and an independence from political control that few would have thought possible. The coup and its aftermath have liberated the university from the control of the board of trustees, most of whom were Monrovia-based politicians. The university is no longer forced to accept automatically the services of politicians and and their relatives who moonlight as part-time lecturers. Thus, the faculty, the administration and the students have a rare opportunity to restructure the university to meet the needs of a reformist society.

A similarly creative role may be in store for the trade unions and the agricultural cooperatives. Both groups were given only grudging legal recognition during the Tubman and Tolbert eras, and both were saddled with restrictions on the way in which they functioned and the degree of autonomy they were allowed. (The sons of both previous Presidents, for example, were "elected" as heads of the national trade union movement.) MOJA-sponsored rural cooperatives, in particular, could be significant structures in meeting modern needs in a traditional fashion. They could attract people back to the land and resolve the food shortage in the country.

Finally, political stances on the part of the PRC augur well for significant reform. Master Sergeant Doe, for example, has not assumed the title of President, preferring instead the more ambiguous title of Head of State. The PRC has appointed a constitutional commission, under the direction of J. Rudolph Grimes (Tubman's Foreign Minister), to fashion a new instrument of government. And the prominent positions in the Cabinet held by reformist civilians certainly support the revolutionary posture. The accelerated program for releasing political prisoners, moreover, means that much of the educated talent—some of whom were largely victims of guilt by association—will now be available for the creative tasks that lie ahead.

IS REFORM GENUINE?

There are, however, two lines of argument that refute the contention that the April 12 coup signaled the start of a genuine reformist revolution. The first argument contends that the old system of privilege will in the long run merely be replaced by a new system. The military will do everything possible to perpetuate itself in office. There has been little serious public discussion of a return to civilian rule, and not even a remote date has been set for elections. Master Sergeant Doe has moved into the executive mansion, and his colleagues have taken over the automobiles and other perquisites and privileges of the departed Tolberts. The sycophantic delegations still come down to Monrovia from the hinterland and long lines of schoolchildren stand in the sun, waiting to greet the returning Head of State from a trip abroad. The constant appearance of machineguns and rifles in public places are, more than anything, demonstrable proof of the military's new power and prestige and its enjoyment of that power.

A subthesis of this argument declares that in the long run the clever Whig politicians will pick up where they left off and will regain much of their lost privilege. They will take advantage of the fact that in the PRC only Doe himself has even an eleventh grade education. And the surviving members of the old elite have the advantage of personal contacts with the international bankers, the foreign managers of the concessions, and the African and other diplomats with whom Liberia must deal if it is to regain economic health and international recognition. This may be too cynical a portrait of the coup.

The second line of argument against the reformist-revolutionary thesis is more difficult to refute. This argument contends that current problems are beyond quick and easy solutions and that the revolutionary momentum may be lost in the interim. Indeed, the failure of the PRC government to deal quickly and definitively with the burning political issue of land reform may be symptomatic of a cluster of problems. For there is not only the question of confiscation versus negotiated purchase of the vast estates of the Americo-Liberians in the hinterland, there is also the social and economic question of whether the lands should be put up for public sale, or returned to the

traditional tenure system based upon usufruct, or whether there should be some combination of state and private ownership.

Beyond the social and political issues involved, the question of land ownership or management relates to the problem of production. Liberia must increase its domestic food production. At the same time, the decline in earnings from iron production during the current worldwide recession in the steel industry is matched by a decrease in rubber sales, related to the declining fortunes of the United States auto industry. Thus, the government may be forced to take a more drastic role in encouraging a diversification of agricultural crops for export. Thus diversification and efficiency in land use may take priority over the political and social aspects of land tenure.

The greatest restraint on a drastic reformist revolution is the nature of the Liberian economy. Under Tubman's open door policy, the role of American, West European, Japanese and other foreign investors and entrepreneurs increased enormously without the emergence of a Liberian cadre. The threat of confiscation or even the serious suggestion of a tilt toward the socialist camp might immediately undermine the economic structure on which the military government survives. There is the long-range prospect of harder bargains with foreign concessions in terms of transferring management to Liberians. There is also the prospect of more processing of agricultural products in Liberia. But a drastic departure from an economy based on state capitalism, private enterprise of the multinational corporation variety, and peasant subsistence cultivation seems unlikely in the immediate future. The continued use of the American dollar as the medium of exchange symbolizes Liberian economic dependence on external forces.

On a positive note, it is apparent that the collapse of society predicted by those who witnessed the initial interethnic violence has not occurred. The economy and the government are functioning, if somewhat precariously. Ironically, the people who are taking charge in Liberia are the tribal people and the lower income Americo-Liberians who were educated under the expanded program of education of the Tubman and Tolbert periods. The absentee landlords, the jet-setting international diplomats, and the central participants in the pageantry of Whig aristocracy are dead, or in jail, or in exile. In retrospect, they were almost superfluous to the real revolution that had been taking place all along under the very noses of the settler elite. ■

SOUTH AFRICA

(Continued from page 114)

to persuade the United States to use its powerful international economic and financial position to discourage and eventually to destroy apartheid in South Africa.

Regardless of the policies of the Reagan administration, black South Africans will continue to fight for their civil and economic rights. Indeed, because radical change will only occur on the ground inside South Africa, external influences like that of the United States are only of secondary importance.

CONCLUSION

As South Africa moves into the 1980's after 33 years of National party rule, it faces many social, economic and political choices and problems. Young black South Africans, all of whom were born and educated in a society dominated by statutory racial discrimination, increasingly reject any cooperation with a government that continues apartheid policies.

The three strongest African political movements, the exiled African National Council, Inkatha, and the Black Consciousness Movement, once led by the late Steve Biko, are now primary forces in South Africa. Of these, the Black Consciousness Movement is most difficult to assess, because of government arrests and restrictions. Yet its impact is in many ways the most decisive of the three. The increasing political awareness of black labor power, the black press and black student power is directly related to the continuing impact of Black Consciousness ideology.

South Africa remains a divided society with blacks and whites separated along political and social lines. Economically, South Africa continues to be a society of haves and have-nots, despite the revenue that has been generated by international boom prices for gold. Will the changes proposed by the government appease a segment of the urban African population and ensure short-term stability? Is South Africa different from Rhodesia, or will it too be increasingly drawn into the kind of protracted guerrilla struggle out of which Zimbabwe emerged?

In other words, can South Africa learn from the mistakes of the white regime in Rhodesia and begin to negotiate with the legitimate leaders of the African people? If it does not do so soon will it inevitably be drawn into a revolutionary struggle? Will the activities of the ANC gather momentum? These are the key questions for the next decade. ■

REHABILITATION IN UGANDA

(Continued from page 119)

economic practices, expectations and legal norms collapsed. The Amin government expanded the money supply rapidly and thoughtlessly, compelled banks to lend in defiance of their accepted procedures, and virtually ceased investing in long-term projects. This

resulted in a greatly overvalued Uganda shilling which stimulated black market activities. *Magendo* led in turn to a lowered tax base and the increased insolvency of the central government. Farmers retreated from the cash crop market into subsistence farming and/or illegal sales of goods across the country's borders. Officials and businessmen devoted more and more of their time to "doing *magendo*" at the expense of their legitimate responsibilities and professions. When one month's minimum pay of Shs. 240 was insufficient to cover the costs of simple food needs (a bunch of *matoke* cost UShs. 150), it became essential to take on additional work, to raise one's own food where possible, and to buy and sell on the black market.[12]

The vital question before the government was whether it could mobilize the necessary political support to enact a package of remedial measures. Such a package, possibly combining effective distribution of commodities, devaluation, and a code of ethics for public officials, was difficult to implement where officials of the government itself had acquired substantial interests in a continuing black market. Government procrastination on such initiatives only contributed to weakened confidence in the regime. However, the requisite policy measures to curb the black market, stimulate growth, and relieve the plight of the working poor were clearer than the question of how and whether the government could muster the political capacity to implement programs that worked against the apparent interests of the most powerful elites. Perhaps the decision to hold the general elections at an earlier date than originally planned might have the effect, whether intended or not, of building a base of support upon which the Obote government could invoke disagreeable (albeit necessary) actions.

Constraints on Agricultural Growth. Traditionally, agriculture has provided 90 percent of Uganda's exports and employment opportunities. Moreover, the greatest part of the agricultural production of the country originated with smallholders who worked plots of some four hectares or less. Under such circumstances the values of growth and equity can fortuitously be reconciled by giving top priority to the requirements of smallholder agriculture. During the Amin period these smallholders increasingly tended away from participation in the official market for monetary agriculture, selling their cash crops through informal channels, or retreating into subsistence farming. The upshot was a steady contraction of activity in the organized, legal, monetary sector of the economy. The extent of the decline in cash crop agriculture can be understood when peak year production is compared with that of the latest available year. Thus coffee output, which accounted for some 86 percent of total export proceeds in the 1974-1978 period, dropped from 251,000 metric tons in 1969 to 120,000 in 1978-1979; cotton fell from 76,000 metric tons in 1970 to 15,000 in 1979; sugar plunged from 144,000 metric tons in 1970 to 8,000 in 1979. The structure of output changed, with subsistence agriculture gaining at the expense of cash crop agriculture.

Among the forms of assistance required to re-engage the energies of the smallholder farmers in the official monetary sector of the economy are adequate price incentives, minimally sufficient transport, soundly managed cooperative marketing and processing institutions, replacement of essential farm inputs lost during the Amin period and the liberation war, and improved extension services. Few if any of these incentives can be efficiently provided until the hold of the black market is substantially reduced. First and foremost, this must entail a devaluation of the currency. The case for devaluation rests not on the poverty level of the smallholders as such (some of them may have prospered irrespective of *magendo* conditions), but upon the need to spread the effects of growth more widely among the population as a whole as well as to provide the resources for the country's development, a provision facilitated by utilizing the official marketing channels as the only available distributional instrument.

Not to be forgotten in the emphasis upon agriculture is the plight of primarily pastoral peoples in the northern and northeastern portions of the country. Because the distribution system in post-Amin times has proved unreliable and inefficient, it has been almost impossible to convey assistance to the drought-ridden north. Widespread starvation in these areas has given rise to armed raiding, with Karamojong bands estimated at between 50 and 500 men and led by officers of the former Amin army, causing further impoverishment and death.[13] The effect has been to render relief efforts perilous. In addition, these conditions have promoted a suspicion that more than an inability to mount a satisfactory relief effort (i.e., ethnic distance) is involved.

Rehabilitation and Growth in the Industrial and Mining Sectors. Although the manufacturing sector is small in comparison with agriculture, consisting largely of agricultural processing and import substitution consumer goods industries, it retains a not insignificant place in the rehabilitation of the Uganda economy. The Amin decade for this sector meant years of disinvestment. Existing plants and equipment were allowed to run down without replacement. Competent managers were forced into exile, to be succeeded by political appointees who lacked the requisite skills or experience. Training institutions for managerial

[12]See *Standard* (Nairobi), March 4, 1980.

[13]Barrie Penrose, "Amin's Men Keep His Bloody Memory Alive," *Sunday Times* (London), May 25, 1980; and John Balcomb, "Hunger in the North While Food Lies in the Stores," *Standard,* March 19, 1980, p. 4.

cadres, denied adequate support, slid quietly into abeyance. Not surprisingly, manufacturing activities declined precipitously. Steel ingot production fell by 75 percent between 1971-1973 and 1978 to a level of 3,000 tons, and similar if somewhat less dramatic drops occurred in the production of soap, vegetable oil, and corrugated iron sheets. Mining of blister copper plummeted by almost 85 percent from 1970 to 1977 to a low of 2,373 tons. In addition to fiscal reform measures and extensive capital investment, the government's task in this sector is to induce managerial cadres in exile to return and to help build the structures that will turn out and utilize a new generation of industrial technicians and managers. The possible contribution of this sector to relieving Uganda's balance of payments problems should in itself provide a development-minded government with the necessary incentives to this end.

Access to Productivity Related Services. While Amin held power in Uganda, substantial changes took place in planning priorities—both in the less developed nations and the organizations providing bilateral and multilateral assistance. The newer emphasis upon the basic human needs of the poor majority has become a meaningful reality in Uganda with Amin's fall. During his rule, a dramatic decline in the quality of the social services was apparent. In part, this was attributable to such factors as an absence of foreign exchange, a rampant black market, the loss of key professional staff, and the slump in public investment in health, water, and educational facilities. The population per physician jumped from 9,800 in 1970 to about 23,000 in the most recent estimate; the statistics on practicing nurses show a rise from 3,770 to 5,500 for the same years. Immunization programs virtually ceased, and, after 1976, the government was no longer able to purchase drugs from its former supplier, the British Crown Agents. By the time the new civilian government had taken hold in Uganda, it was not inappropriate to speak of a "health emergency." Similarly, educational institutions reportedly lacked texts, paper and teachers, contributing to declining standards and a lack of preparation that showed itself only too clearly in "A" level examination results. Many water and sewerage facilities, by the same token, were not in operation by the end of the liberation war.

The heart of the service sector problem lies in the long-established tendency to pay too little heed to the requirements of Uganda's poor majority. Given the importance of smallholder production in agriculture, the key task would seem to be to place more emphasis on preventive health care and on local health stations than on the restoration of the hospital system, particularly Mulago hospital in Kampala. Stimulating the revival of prestigious Makerere University, Kampala must depend in part upon the use of that facility to promote research of immediate value to the living standards of the rural poor, e.g., in agricultural research. Non-formal education, appropriate technology, work-related education at the primary and secondary levels, and strong vocational and technical education programs must supplant the former emphasis on university-oriented academic curricula. The task, in short, is to restore the service sector in ways that give primary support to the restoration of efficient smallholder food and cash crop production. The urban poor, while numerically a smaller group, must likewise participate in the benefits of such a basic needs reorientation.

Weakened Political Institutions. The primacy of political renewal to the rehabilitation and subsequent development of Uganda is a recurring theme. Clearly, Ugandan authorities must move swiftly to strengthen their country's political institutions and processes. As of 1978, noted the Commonwealth Team of Experts, Uganda had "become a classic example of the economic retribution that falls on a country when its government attempts self-reliance but lacks a rational system of decision-making and has destroyed the administrative capacity to implement them."[14]

President Obote stated prior to his reelection that "there is an absence of leadership." It is by no means clear, however, that as an individual he will be able to overcome this obstacle. Even though government ministries have seemed generally able to articulate objectives, there appears to have been little predilection to do the hard tasks of ranking priorities as between these objectives, implementing policies, and monitoring results. Not only have audit agencies shown themselves to be relatively ineffective, but there have been few means to enforce their findings where misallocations of scarce commodities have been detected.

Not all of this political morass can be attributed to the limited capacities of those in charge of the post-liberation regime. To some extent the government itself has become so permeated by the effects of the economic and social crisis that it is unable to deal decisively with the challenge of institution-building. The UNLF has not eradicated the impact Amin had on the country's political fabric in a little more than a year. Even when Obote's regime was at its zenith in the mid-1960's, Uganda as a political entity could at best be described as delicately constructed and maintained.[15] Moreover, the difficulties of a post-liberation government relying for security upon the military forces of a neighboring power, no matter how well intentioned, have been real and perplexing. Clearly,

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[14]Commonwealth Team, *op. city.*, vol. 1, p. 3.

[15]See the discussion on regional-central relations in Donald Rothchild and Michael Rogin, "Uganda," in Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 337-60.

such dependence on another African power complicates the process of self-generated institutionalization, putting off the day when the new political order gains legitimacy in the eyes of its citizenry.

To be sure, Uganda still boasts large numbers of highly competent and dedicated civil servants, some of whom remained in the country throughout the Amin decade while others went into exile. The question is whether, using the mechanism of general elections, the new Obote administration can reconcile liberals and traditionalists, exiles and those who remained in the country, and northerners and southerners, in some form of working coalition.

Weakened East African Linkages. Certainly coordinated regional development offers East Africa as a whole a means of maximizing its expansion of resources. Regional harmonization enhances opportunities for economic growth and development by creating possibilities for economics of scale, diversification of resources and activities, comparative advantage, bulk purchasing abilities, enlarged external bargaining power, and region-wide planning.[16] However, the centrifugal pressures of state nationalism, conflicting political and economic interests, and competing ideologies, made more acute by the military adventurism of the Amin government, caused the disruption of the East African Community and many of the informal political, social, and economic ties that bound East Africa together in a single overarching community.

The longer the Amin regime stayed in power the more pronounced were the cleavages that separated it from the former partner states within the region. Bottlenecks occurred on the railroad lifeline linking Uganda to the port of Mombasa; tourism was disrupted; the integrated airline system collapsed; and the community headquarters in the Uganda sub-unit proved difficult to maintain in the face of growing uncertainties about the security situation.

Even so, many of the basic interdependencies have survived Amin's misrule and the inter-unit conflicts of interest, ideology, and personalities. The presence of new leadership in both Kenya and Uganda has opened the way to a resumption of high-level regional contacts—for example the January, 1980, Arusha summit attended by Presidents Nyerere, Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, and Binaisa, and continuing indications of Obote's support for revived East African connections.[17] In addition, transportation and communications links are still evident (although the Kenya-Tanzanian border remains closed for the time being), personal friendships continue to transcend state borders, and administrative cooperation in a number of sectors remains a possibility despite evidence of continued obstacles. Even though Kenya reneged on the shipment of maize to Uganda (in return for foreign-supplied wheat), the two countries nevertheless share the electric power originating at the Owen Falls Hydro station. Uganda currently generates more electric power than it needs, and therefore is in a position to supply Kenya with 37 percent of its output. Pricing of the power remains a knotty problem, however, as Kenya contributes only 10 percent of the total revenues. As Uganda's own power needs grow, an increasing conflict of interest on this issue can be anticipated.

[16]See Rothchild, *Politics of Integration* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1966).

[17]For a discussion of the Arusha summit, see *Weekly Review,* January 4, 1980, p. 5.

PRIORITIES FOR REHABILITATION

An examination of the constraints on Uganda's recovery and development shows the wide-ranging nature of the post-liberation crisis. Economic and infrastructural recovery cannot be considered in isolation but in conjunction with a systemic rebuilding of society-state-international relationships. Hence one may start with short-term recovery measures (food aid, restoration of transport, agricultural inputs, repair of the water system, medical relief, the reduction of economic distortions, the rebuilding of the internal security system, and so forth); but such efforts are not seen as ends in themselves, but as tied to broader programs of economic, political, and social betterment. Sick and hungry people cannot rebuild their economies efficiently; therefore, an immediate injection of domestic and external assistance for the purpose of unleashing the forces for sustained productivity seems mandatory. But once the first-phase recovery assistance has reduced the production and distribution bottlenecks and overcome the most glaring monetary and fiscal distortions of the immediate past, it is necessary to orient subsequent rehabilitation efforts, as far as possible, to the achievement of longer term ends.

What does this entail in Uganda? In an internationally dependent agricultural society, there must be an emphasis on increasing the production of foodstuffs as well as cash crops, developing industries linked to the agricultural sector, and improving social services and standards of living in the rural areas.

But, the marked predilection to view the current Uganda rehabilitation process in strictly economic terms seems partial in nature and hence likely to prove self-defeating. Proposed "solutions" of international lending agencies to the problem of productivity such as currency devaluation and curbs on monetary irregularities appear to point as much to symptoms as to root causes. As shown by Ghana's experiences in the late 1970's, a sharp devaluation of the currency did not resolve the economic crisis but led, in the absence of other structural reforms, to a further widening of the gap between the official and unofficial

rate of the cedi. Price controls which are put into effect without the underpinning of an effective administrative apparatus are likely to have little real economic impact. And curbs on monetary expansion are only a beginning effort in the direction of restored faith in the government process. The restoration of political legitimacy and administrative efficacy are not subsidiary but central to the achievement of rehabilitation. Paradoxically, the variables of political legitimacy and administrative efficiency, which turn out to be critical to Uganda's genuine recovery, are least influenced by the current fragile regime or by external assistance agencies. ■

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA

(Continued from page 129)

arms and other support to the UNITA guerrillas in Angola who continue to oppose the Marxist MPLA government, which is sustained by Cuban troops. In late 1979, Freedom House and some conservative Republican Senators invited Jonas Savimbi, head of UNITA, to come to the United States to develop support for United States aid to UNITA's continued struggle against the Marxist Angolan government. There is already a campaign for such a policy among conservative Republican Senators.

The three-year, United States-European attempt to negotiate for the United Nations a settlement of the war in Namibia between SWAPO guerrillas and South Africa was shattered by South Africa at the January, 1981, Geneva talks. South Africa has persistently declined to accept the terms offered for a cease-fire, elections and independence for Namibia, despite many concessions by Western negotiators and SWAPO. The African states strongly supported this long, exasperating negotiating process. In 1981, they will probably introduce resolutions for mandatory sanctions against South Africa in the United Nations. The Reagan administration will not support United Nations sanctions.

In order to obtain South Africa's cooperation for the negotiations on Zimbabwe and Namibia, the Carter administration took no firm measures against South Africa to demonstrate its opposition to apartheid. Its policies were excessively cautious and involved a great deal of wishful thinking about the possibilities for "reform" in South Africa, under Prime Minister Piet Botha. The Reagan administration will be more well-disposed toward South Africa, although the pariah status of South Africa should prevent Reagan from overtly supporting it.

Nonetheless, there has been a great deal of discussion of the "strategic" significance of South Africa, in light of the heavily traveled Cape route around southern Africa as a strategic choke point, where an unfriendly government could cut off Persian Gulf oil supplies carried by supertankers to Europe and the United States. There has also been a highly orchestrated chorus with regard to increased American dependence on mineral imports and the significance of South Africa as the major producer of minerals essential to Western industrial and defense production. President Reagan's leading foreign policy adviser, Richard Allen, on a 1980 visit to South Africa, observed that there were strategic reasons for closer United States relations with the South African government.

OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID

Opposition to the racist South African regime is the single most important issue that unites African states. If the United States forges closer relations with South Africa or even softens its stand against South Africa, several strategically undesirable consequences are probable: the Soviet Union and Cuba will gain stature and their intervention may be welcomed by African states because of their opposition to South Africa; Nigeria may withhold contracts from American companies; and three African countries—Nigeria, Libya and Algeria—the second, fourth and fifth largest sources of United States oil imports—may well undertake to withhold oil from United States markets, especially if there is an oil shortage; or Nigeria may nationalize United States oil companies there. African animosity toward South Africa may unite African oil producers in an oil embargo of the United States just as animosity toward Israel united the Arab states. Closer American ties with South Africa would indicate to the African states that the United States is wholly indifferent to the most powerful emotional issue in inter-African politics.[9]

The cold war considerations that appear to dominate the thinking of President Reagan's policy advisers have already given some encouragement to highly repressive anti-democratic forces in Latin America. African leaders are suspicious of the new administration's intentions. One can only hope that the Reagan administration will recall the cost to American interests in Southeast Asia and Iran when grand strategies were pursued without concern for their local consequences. ■

[9]See Chester Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 59, no. 2 (winter, 1980/1981), pp. 323-351.

Erratum: The editors regret an error that appeared in the article by George Lenczowski, "The Persian Gulf Crisis and Global Oil," in the January, 1981, issue. The sentence beginning on page 10, paragraph 2, line 9, should read, "There were, furthermore, reported attacks on two lesser refineries, those of Kermanshah and Lavan Island, each of 19,000 b/d capacity."

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of January, 1981, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

East-West Conference on Human Rights and Cooperation

Jan. 27—In Madrid, the Conference on Human Rights and Cooperation in Europe resumes after a 5-week recess.

European Economic Community (EEC)

Jan. 5—Greece officially joins the EEC.

Iran Crisis

Jan. 6—In Teheran, Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Rajai announces that Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has approved the role of Algerian intermediaries; on January 2, Algerian Ambassador to the U.S. Redha Malek, Algerian Ambassador to Iran Abdelkarim Gheraieb and Algerian Central Bank director Mohammed Seghier Mostefai arrived in Teheran with a U.S. proposal for the release of the U.S. hostages.

Jan. 7—In Washington, D.C., a spokesman for the U.S. State Department announces that Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher will go to Algeria to assist in the negotiations.

Jan. 8—In Washington, D.C., U.S. President-elect Ronald Reagan says his administration will honor any agreement with Iran reached by U.S. President Jimmy Carter; but Reagan reserves the right to formulate a new proposal if the crisis is not resolved by January 20.

Jan. 15—Following a meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini and Prime Minister Rajai, hostage negotiator Behzad Nabavi, Iranian Minister for External Affairs, announces that the money and gold must be transferred before the hostages are released. U.S. banks have agreed to transfer $5.5 billion in frozen Iranian assets, including $2.5 billion in gold and other assets held at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York and about $3 billion in bank deposits held in Europe.

Jan. 18—At midnight in Teheran, Behzad Nabavi announces that an agreement has been reached between the U.S. and Iran. Warren Christopher initials the agreement in Algiers. An appendix to the accord is relayed to Nabavi.

Jan. 19—The delay caused by the appendix forces U.S. President Jimmy Carter to cancel his plan to fly to Wiesbaden, West Germany, to greet the hostages before his term expires.

Jan. 20—In Washington, D.C., at 3 a.m., White House spokesman Jody Powell announces that an agreement has been reached by Washington and Teheran.

In Teheran, 25 minutes after President Reagan's inauguration, the 52 hostages are put aboard an Algerian airliner at Mehrabad Airport.

Jan. 21—In Algiers, the former U.S. hostages are greeted by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher and the members of the Algerian negotiating team and foreign ministry. The released hostages are flown to Wiesbaden, West Germany, where they will remain for several days.

In Wiesbaden, former President Carter greets the freed hostages.

Jan. 22—In Washington, D.C., a State Department official says the Reagan administration "fully intends to carry out the commitments to Iran made by the Carter administration to obtain the release of the hostages."

Jan. 25—In Washington, D.C., the families of the former hostages meet with President Reagan.

The released hostages arrive in West Point, N.Y.; they are taken to the U.S. Military Academy.

Jan. 27—In Washington, D.C., President Reagan welcomes the 52 Americans who were held by Iranian militants for 14 months.

Islamic Summit Conference

Jan. 25—The leaders of 37 Muslim nations and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) open talks in Taif, Saudi Arabia; Iran, Libya, Egypt and Afghanistan will not take part in the conference.

Jan. 27—The Islamic conference adopts a resolution calling for the immediate Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Jan. 28—Lebanese President Elias Sarkis asks the conference to help bring "an end to uncoordinated and unilateral action . . ." by the PLO in southern Lebanon because it is harming Lebanon.

Jan. 29—The 4-day Islamic conference ends with a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war and for united action, particularly economic action, to recover Arab territories, including East Jerusalem.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Jan. 10—Kuwait raises the price of its crude oil to $35.50 per barrel, retroactive to January 1.

Jan. 12—The *Middle East Economic Survey* reports that Iraq is raising the price of its crude oil to $36 per barrel.

Jan. 14—The Iranian press agency Pars announces that Iran is raising the price of its crude oil to $37 per barrel; Iran is exporting almost a million barrels a day.

Persian Gulf Crisis

Jan. 5—In Teheran, to counter criticism at home Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr announces that the Iranian Army has begun an offensive against Iraqi forces in Iran, from Dizful toward Susangird and Ahwaz.

Jan. 8—Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan, a member of Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council, denies recent Iranian claims of victory and says that Iraqi troops have taught Iranians "a lesson they will never forget."

Jan. 15—In an apparent attempt to explain Iran's inability to expel the Iraqi forces, Bani-Sadr says Iraq is receiving military advisers and arms supplies from the Soviet Union.

Jan. 19—After talks with Iraqi and Iranian leaders in his 2d attempt to negotiate a peace settlement, U.N. special envoy Olof Palme returns to New York.

Jan. 25—Fighting is reported between Iraqi and Iranian forces in the mountainous area of western Kurdistan province.

United Nations

(See *Intl, Persian Gulf Crisis; Cambodia*)

ALGERIA

(See *Intl, Iran Crisis*)

CAMBODIA

Jan. 23—A spokesman for the U.N. Children's Fund says that Cambodia has a sufficient food supply and that the U.N. is suspending its relief effort.

CANADA

Jan. 18—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau completes a 4-nation trip; he met with leaders of Nigeria, Senegal, Brazil and Mexico.

Jan. 30—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau says he will continue to try "to gain control of the constitution" despite today's decision of the foreign affairs committee of the British House of Commons to reject his plan for "patriation" of the constitution.

CHAD

Jan. 6—In Tripoli, the Libyan press agency reports that Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi and Chad President Goukouni Oueddei have agreed to merge their countries; under a defense treaty signed last June, Libya will send additional troops to Chad.

Lagos radio reports that the Nigerian government has given Libya 48 hours to close its mission in Lagos.

Jan. 7—In Paris, the French government cancels an oil-exploration agreement with Libya because of Libya's recent incursion into Chad and the proposed merger of the 2 countries.

Jan. 9—French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing orders the reinforcement of French military detachments in the Central African Republic in an effort to curtail Libyan expansion.

CHINA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 1—In Beijing, Chairman Hua Guofeng fails to attend a New Year's Day celebration given by the Central Committee, furthering rumors that he has been removed as party chairman.

Jan. 3—Deputy Chairman of the Communist party Deng Xiaoping becomes head of the party's Military Commission, replacing Hua Guofeng.

Jan. 25—Jiang Qing, Chairman Mao Zedong's widow, and Zhang Chunqiao, the former mayor of Shanghai, are sentenced to death by a special court for their role in the Cultural Revolution; the court suspends their sentences for 2 years and sends them to prison. Others on trial receive prison sentences ranging from 16 years to life; no appeal is permitted.

COLOMBIA

Jan. 21—In Bogota, a spokesman for the April 19 Movement claims responsibility for the January 19 kidnapping of Chester Bitterman, a U.S. citizen working with the U.S.-based Summer Language Institute; the guerrillas demand that the institute leave the country.

ECUADOR

(See *Peru*)

EL SALVADOR

Jan. 3—In San Salvador, 2 U.S. citizens working for the American Institute for Free Labor Development, Michael P. Hammer and Mark David Pearlman, and Salvadoran José Rodolfo Viera of the Institute for Agrarian Transformation are gunned down and killed in a hotel coffee shop.

Jan. 5—In San Salvador, military forces report killing 30 people whom they say were left-wing guerrillas.

Jan. 9—In San Salvador, military forces kill 22 people they accuse of being subversives.

Jan. 10—The left-wing Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front declares the beginning of a "final offfensive" to dismantle the U.S.-supported military-civilian regime.

Jan. 11—The government declares a dawn-to-dusk curfew.

Jan. 14—In Washington, D.C., a State Department spokesman announces the resumption of U.S. military aid to the government; $5 million in U.S. aid is granted to counter the recent left-wing offensive.

Jan. 17—The U.S. State Department announces that it will deliver an additional $5 million worth of combat equipment to El Salvador in addition to the $5 million in "non-lethal" military equipment granted January 14.

FRANCE

(See also *Chad*)

Jan. 4—In Paris, a bomb planted by members of the Guadeloupe Liberation Army destroys the world famous Chanel store.

GERMANY, WEST

(See also *Poland*)

Jan. 15—Following a financial scandal involving $57 million in defaulted loans, West Berlin Mayor Dietrich Stobbe and members of his administration resign.

Jan. 23—West German Justice Minister Hans-Jocken Vogel is elected Mayor of West Berlin by the West Berlin parliament.

GREECE

(See *Intl, EEC*)

IRAN

(See also *Intl, Iran Crisis, Persian Gulf Crisis; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 27—President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr claims that the political opposition has tried to assassinate him twice in the last 2 months.

ISRAEL

Jan. 3—In Jerusalem, Hammad Abu Rabia, a Bedouin member of Parliament, is assassinated by gunmen.

Jan. 4—The Cabinet approves the appointment of Aryeh Ivzan to replace General Herzl Shafir as head of the national police; Interior Minister Yosef Burg dismissed Shafir on December 31, 1980, for resisting civilian supervision.

Jan. 11—After much debate, the Cabinet votes to increase schoolteacher salaries substantially; after the vote, Finance Minister Yigael Hurwitz resigns.

Jan. 18—Prime Minister Menachem Begin announces his Cabinet's decision to call elections on July 7.

Jan. 19—The Cabinet names Communications Minister Yoram Aridor to replace Hurwitz as Finance Minister.

Jan. 25—In Jerusalem, the police announce that Seif Muadi, a lieutenant in the Israeli army, has confessed to killing Sheik Hammad Abu Rabia; Muadi is the son of Sheik Jaber Muadi, who succeeded to Abu Rabia's seat in Parliament.

Jan. 26—Parliament's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee approves a Cabinet decision to establish 3 more settlements in the occupied West Bank.

ITALY

Jan. 5—The government rejects the demands of Red Brigade terrorists who kidnapped Rome magistrate Giovanni D'Urso on December 12; the terrorists are demanding that newspapers print uncensored the remarks of 2 political prisoners held in maximum security prisons.

Jan. 11—Most Italian papers refuse to publish the statement made by the prisoners.

Jan. 15—Despite the government's lack of compliance with the kidnappers' demands, Magistrate D'Urso is released unharmed in Rome.

JAMAICA

Jan. 19—In Washington, D.C., the out-going administration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter grants the newly elected government of Prime Minister Edward Seaga a $40-million economic support loan.

Jan. 28—In Washington, D.C., Prime Minister Seaga meets with U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

JAPAN

Jan. 8—Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki leaves for the Philippines to begin his 12-day trip to 5 Southeast Asian nations.

Jan. 13—The budget for the coming fiscal year calls for a 7.6 percent increase in government military spending; the U.S. was hoping for an 11 percent increase.

Jan. 24—In Washington, D.C., Finance Minister Michio Watanabe tells members of the Reagan administration that a consortium of 7 Japanese banks has agreed to cancel its claims against the U.S. Chrysler corporation.

Jan. 26—In a policy speech to Parliament, Prime Minister Suzuki outlines plans to "more than double" Japan's foreign aid by 1985.

KENYA

Jan. 7—The government news agency identifies Qaddura Mohammed Abd al-Hamid, a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, as the man who planted a bomb New Year's Eve at the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi; 15 people were killed and 85 were injured in the explosion.

KOREA, SOUTH

Jan. 12—The martial law command lifts the 7-month-old ban on political activities in anticipation of the elections next month.

Jan. 15—President Chun Doo Hwan announces his candidacy for President under the banner of the newly formed Democratic Justice party.

Jan. 17—Opposition politicians form the Democratic Korea party.

Jan. 23—The Supreme Court affirms the death penalty for sedition against Kim Dae Jung, opposition political leader.

President Chun commutes Kim's death sentence to life imprisonment.

Jan. 24—President Chun Doo Hwan lifts the state of martial law, which was declared after anti-government demonstrations last May.

LIBYA

(See *Chad; Nigeria*)

MEXICO

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

NAMIBIA (South-West Africa)

Jan. 7—In Geneva, a conference begins under the auspices of the U.N. to negotiate a cease-fire between the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the government of South Africa that would lead to elections and independence for the territory.

Jan. 13—In Geneva, administrator general of South-West Africa Danie Hough says that it is "premature" to set a date for a cease-fire. South African spokesman Dirk Mudge, chairman of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, says it is too soon to hold elections. The conference ends in failure.

NICARAGUA

Jan. 22—In Washington, D.C., the U.S. State Department suspends payments from a $75-million loan to Nicaragua, because of evidence that Nicaragua's Sandinist government has been supplying arms to the left-wing guerrillas in El Salvador.

NIGERIA

(See also *Chad*)

Jan. 9—It is reported that over the last 2 weeks more than 1,000 members of an Islamic cult led by Alhaji Mohammadu Marwa were killed in Kano by government troops; government officials say "We have every reason to believe Libya was involved in creating the disorder that led to the government's action."

Jan. 12—In Lagos, President Shehu Shagari submits his government's 4th national development plan to Parliament; he calls for $6.4 billion in military spending.

NORWAY

Jan. 13—Parliament agrees to permit the U.S. to store weapons in central Norway.

Jan. 29—Prime Minister Odvar Nordli resigns; he has been criticized by members of his own party for permitting the U.S. to stockpile weapons near Norway's Soviet border.

PERU

Jan. 31—Following 4 days of fighting between Peruvian and Ecuadoran troops in the Cordillera del Cóndor in Tumbes province, President Fernando Belaúnde Terry rejects an Ecuadoran proposal for peace talks. On January 29, an Ecuadoran spokesman denounced the 1941 treaty that set the boundaries for the 2 nations, and Ecuadoran forces shot at a Peruvian helicopter delivering food supplies to the border region.

PHILIPPINES

Jan. 5—In Baguio City, thousands of gold miners go on strike in a wage dispute, after 10 months of negotiations.

Jan. 6—Labor Minister Blas F. Ople orders the 6,500 striking miners back to work.

Jan. 17—President Ferdinand E. Marcos orders an end to martial law and the release of 341 prisoners, including some political and common criminals; Marcos specifies that all decrees and orders issued under martial law are to remain in effect.

Jan. 19—President Marcos officially transfers to the National Assembly legislative powers denied it 8 years ago when martial law was declared; Marcos retains the right to issue decrees.

POLAND

Jan. 5—The West German government agrees to guarantee $153 million in loans to Poland.

Jan. 7—In Gdansk, the national commission of the independent trade union Solidarity demands a 5-day workweek beginning January 10; the government has proposed 2 work-free Saturdays a month.

Jan. 10—Most workers support the union's call for a work stoppage and about 80 percent of the nation's factories close.

Jan. 11—Over national television, Communist party leader Stanislaw Kania warns farmers that "there is no room in the Polish countryside for a political opposition of an anti-socialistic character."

Jan. 13—In Warsaw, Soviet commander of the Warsaw Pact Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov meets with Polish leader Stanislaw Kania.

Jan. 14—In the southeastern town of Rzeszow, workers stage "warning strikes" for the 2d day to support farm union supporters, who were evicted from public buildings by the police yesterday.

Jan. 16—In Warsaw, bus and streetcar workers stage a 4-hour strike in support of union demands for a 5-day workweek.

Jan. 21—In Warsaw, government officials and labor leaders begin to discuss the issue of a 5-day workweek.

Jan. 23—Solidarity leader Lech Walesa calls on workers to boycott work on Saturday, January 24.

Jan. 24—Most major industries throughout the country close, as workers stage a boycott.

Jan. 27—Spontaneous labor strikes take place throughout the country as workers try to resolve local labor issues; 110 factories in the Bielsko-Biala area are affected.

Jan. 28—In Lodz, university students continue their sit-in for a fifth day; they are demanding more autonomy for the university.

Jan. 29—The government warns that it is prepared "to take necessary steps" to keep industry running despite the strikes.

Solidarity leader Lech Walesa calls on workers to return to work.

Jan. 31—After Prime Minister Jozef Pinkowski and Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Jagielski meet with Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, a government spokesman announces an agreement on a 40-hour, 5-day workweek next year; workers will work every 4th Saturday this year; the union is to have access to the state-run radio and television. No agreement is reached on the formation of farmers' unions.

PORTUGAL

Jan. 9—Prime Minister Francisco Pinto Balsemão and his Democratic Alliance coalition Cabinet are sworn in.

Jan. 14—President António Ramalho Eanes is sworn in as President for a 2d term.

SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Namibia*)

Jan. 1—The government bans 2 black leaders of the Media Workers Association, Zwelakhe Sisulu and Marimuthu Subramoney; under the bannings they are restricted from participating in organized activity for 3 years.

Jan. 13—Compulsory elementary school education for blacks begins.

Jan. 20—The government prohibits publication of the country's largest black newspaper, the *Post*.

Jan. 22—The 8-month-old boycott of schools by black and colored students ends.

Jan. 28—Prime Minister P.W. Botha calls for new elections in April.

Jan. 30—Government forces raid the headquarters of the African National Congress (ANC) in Maputo, Mozambique's capital; 11 members of the ANC are killed in the attack.

SPAIN

Jan. 29—Prime Minister Adolfo Súarez resigns; he will retain his seat in Parliament.

SURINAME

Jan. 6—The military government ousts Vice President Andre Haakmat for creating dissension among Cabinet ministers and military officials; Haakmat was also Foreign Minister, Justice Minister and Defense Minister.

TAIWAN

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

TURKEY

Jan. 2—Martial law authorities arrest the president and 9 professors of the Academy of Economic and Commercial Sciences in Adana.

Jan. 7—Martial law authorities report the arrest of 85 leftists in a renewed government attack on left-wing organizations.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Poland; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 28—In Moscow, a Defense Ministry spokesman accuses members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of trying to detach Poland from the Warsaw Pact.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Canada*)

Jan. 11—Because of a wage dispute, members of the National Union of Seamen refuse to work on British ships in selected ports; the union is demanding a 16-percent wage increase.

Jan. 23—In an editorial, *The Times* (London) explains its decision to sell the newspaper to Australian publisher and owner of *The New York Post* Rupert Murdoch.

Northern Ireland

Jan. 16—Near Belfast, Protestant paramilitary gunmen attack and seriously wound Bernadette Devlin McAliskey and her husband.

Jan. 22—In Belfast, a spokesman for the outlawed Irish Republican Army claims responsibility for last night's murder of two leading Protestants, Sir Norman Stronge and his son James.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Jan. 2—State Department and Justice Department officials report that they will appeal a decision handed down by U.S. district court Judge Richard D. Rogers. Rogers ruled on December 31, 1980, that Pedro Rodriguez, a Cuban refugee being held in Leavenworth Penitentiary as a security risk, must be freed on parole unless the government can prove that he should be jailed until he can be sent back to Cuba; the decision may affect some 1,800 Cubans in detention.

Jan. 5—Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti approves new guidelines for Federal Bureau of Investigation probes; undercover agents will be authorized to offer bribes to public officials, but "entrapment should be avoided."

All men born in 1962 register for the draft this week.

Jan. 6—President-elect Ronald Reagan announces the appointment of James S. Brady to be White House press secretary.

At a joint session of Congress, Vice President Walter Mondale announces the official tally of electoral votes in the 1980 election: 489 for Ronald Reagan and 49 for President Jimmy Carter.

Jan. 7—President-elect Reagan announces the appointment of Utah Commissioner of Higher Education T. H. Bell as Secretary of Education; he says he will retain former Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), as U.S. Ambassador to Japan.

In a letter to President Carter, the 4 members of the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee report that almost 2 years after the Three Mile Island nuclear accident there is still no overall federal policy for the protection of 3.3 million people living near the 73 operating nuclear power plants in this country.

Jan. 8—U.S. district court Judge Frank A. Kaufman sentences former Central Intelligence Agency employee David H. Barnett to 18 years in prison for espionage.

Jan. 10—President-elect Reagan's transition office announces the appointment of Frank M. Carlucci as Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Jan. 13—Bernadine Dohrn, reputed former leader of the Weather Underground, is fined $1,500 and placed on probation for 3 years by a Chicago criminal court after she pleaded guilty to charges resulting from protests against the Vietnam war in 1969.

Jan. 14—In a nationwide television broadcast from the White House, President Carter makes a farewell speech to the nation; he warns of the dangers of nuclear war and the need for protection of the environment and the "enhancement of individual rights."

Jan. 15—President-elect Reagan selects chairman of the Republican National Committee Bill Brock as special U.S. trade representative.

President Carter sends Congress a budget for fiscal 1982 of $739.3 billion, with a deficit of $27.5 billion; he also asks for an additional $6.3 billion for the Defense Department for fiscal 1981.

Jan. 16—President Carter sends his final State of the Union message to Congress; he warns of "serious problems"—inflation, unemployment and a possible world oil shortage.

The President's Commission for a National Agenda for the 1980's reports to President Carter; among other recommendations the 44-member panel urges the government to encourage Americans in the northeast to migrate to the south and west (the Sunbelt).

Jan. 20—Californian Ronald Reagan is inaugurated as the 40th President of the United States. Texan George Bush is sworn in as Vice President. President Reagan promises "an era of national renewal."

In a 97-2 vote, the Senate confirms Caspar W. Weinberger as Secretary of Defense.

Jan. 21—In a 93-6 vote, the Senate confirms Alexander M. Haig, Jr., as Secretary of State.

Jan. 22—The Senate confirms Drew Lewis as Secretary of Transportation, Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; John R. Block as Secretary of Agriculture; William F. Smith as Attorney General and Malcolm Baldrige as Secretary of Commerce.

President Reagan orders a 15 percent reduction in travel by government employees and a 5 percent reduction in the government's use of consulting services.

Jan. 23—President Reagan announces the appointment of California Supreme Court Justice William Clark as Deputy Secretary of State; Murray L. Weidenbaum is named chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

Jan. 24—President Reagan nominates Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., as Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Vice Admiral B.R. Inman as deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Senate unanimously confirms William J. Casey as director of the Central Intelligence Agency and David A. Stockman as director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Jan. 28—President Reagan ends remaining price and allocation controls on domestic oil and gasoline; this action is expected to raise the price of gasoline some $.03 to $.12 per gallon by summer's end.

Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan says that President Reagan is asking Congress for a $50-billion increase in the temporary national debt limit, to $985 billion.

Jan. 29—At his 1st press conference, President Reagan announces a 60-day freeze on pending government regulations and the abolition of the Council on Wage and Price Stability.

President Reagan announces the appointment of Ambassador to West Germany Walter Stoessel, Jr., as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and former Senator James L. Buckley (R., N.Y.) as Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance Programs.

Jan. 30—Acting Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service David Crosland orders all district directors to begin possible expulsion hearings for Haitians (some 3,900), who entered the Miami district after October 11, 1980.

The White House announces that President Ronald Reagan has sold many of his assests for cash, which is being placed in a blind trust managed by Starwood Corporation president Raymond J. Armstrong.

Civil Rights

Jan. 7—U.S. district court Judge Nauman Scott signs charges of contempt of court against the parents of 3 white schoolgirls, school officials in Rapides Parish, Lousiana, and state district court Judge Richard Lee. Lee has ordered the girls to attend all-white Buckeye High School in defiance of a desegregation plan ordered by Judge Scott last August 6, under which the 3 girls (and hundreds of other pupils) were transferred to racially mixed schools; most other pupils and their parents have obeyed Judge Scott's order.

Jan. 15—Judge Scott drops contempt charges against Judge Lee.

Jan. 26—The 3 white Buckeye High School girls involved in a desegregation dispute in Louisiana begin attendance in a white private school.

Economy

Jan. 6—New York's Chemical Bank lowers its prime rate to 19.5 percent; most major banks lowered their prime rate to 20.5 percent on January 3.

Jan. 9—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate was 7.4 percent in December.

The Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 0.6 percent in December; the index rose 11.7 percent for all of 1980.

Jan. 21—The Commerce Department reports that the gross national product (GNP) grew at an annual rate of 5 percent in the 4th quarter of 1980.

Jan. 23—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 1.1 percent in December.

Jan. 28—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade balance showed a deficit of just under $3 billion in December.

Jan. 30—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators fell 0.8 percent in December.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Iran Crisis; El Salvador; Jamaica; Japan; Nicaragua*)

Jan. 5—President-elect Reagan meets with Mexican President José López Portillo in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.

Jan. 6—Senator Ted Stevens (R., Alaska) and Anna Chennault conclude 3 days of conferences in China and arrive in Taipei, Taiwan, for informal talks with Taiwan's President Chiang Ching-Kuo and other officials.

Jan. 27—In a formal ceremony on the south lawn of the White House, President Ronald Reagan welcomes the liberated hostages; the President warns that, in the future, "when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution."

In a Washington, D.C., interview, former Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher reveals that negotiations for the release of the hostages were initiated by Iran in secret last September; Christopher also reveals that the U.S. asked Algeria to act as intermediary in the negotiations.

Jan. 28—Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jr., says that the U.S. will not supply some $500 million worth of military equipment, ordered but not shipped to Iran before the taking of the hostages; Haig warns American business to be extremely wary of doing business with Iran or traveling there.

Jan. 29—President Reagan accuses Soviet leaders of reserving for themselves "the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat" as he discloses a U.S. message to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that warns of an unfavorable, long-lasting impact on U.S.-Soviet relations if Soviet troops move into Poland.

Labor and Industry

Jan. 7—With the arrival of a Chinese 747 jet with 139 passengers at San Francisco airport, regularly scheduled air service between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China begins.

Jan. 12—The Labor Department rules that, beginning February 13, supervisory employees exempt from overtime pay requirements must be paid a minimum of $225 a week; exempted professional employees must be paid $250 per week. Employers not willing to pay the new rates must pay their employees for overtime.

Jan. 14—The Chrysler Loan Guarantee Board gives initial approval to Chrysler's request for $400 million in government-guaranteed loans.

Jan. 16—In U.S. district court in Washington, D.C., Judge Harold Greene suspends proceedings in the government's antitrust suit against the American Telephone and Telegraph Company at least until February 2 because both parties report that they have reached a "tangible, concrete agreement" for settlement of the case.

Legislation

Jan. 5—The 97th Congress convenes. In the Senate, Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R., Tenn.), is majority leader and Senator Ted Stevens (R., Alaska) is majority whip; Senator Robert C. Byrd (D., W.Va.) is minority leader and Senator Alan Cranston (D., Ca.) is minority whip.

The Democrats retain control of the House; Representative Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (D., Mass.), is Speaker of the House and Representative Jim Wright (D., Tex.) is majority leader.

Political Scandal

Jan. 26—In U.S. district court in Washington, D.C., former Representative Richard Kelly (R., Fla.) is convicted on bribery and conspiracy charges resulting from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Abscam investigations.

Politics

Jan. 17—Utah lawyer Richard Richards is elected chairman of the Republican National Committee, succeeding Bill Brock.

Supreme Court

Jan. 19—The Supreme Court refuses to hear an appeal from 2 lower court decisions upholding the civil contempt conviction of *Philadelphia Inquirer* reporter Jan Schaffer for refusing to reveal her sources of information in an Abscam trial before U.S. district court Judge John Fullam in Philadelphia.

Jan. 21—In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court affirms a lower court ruling revoking Feodor Fedorenko's citizenship, because he failed to disclose his service as an armed guard at a Nazi extermination camp at Treblinka when he applied for an entrance visa to the U.S. in 1949.

Jan. 26—In an 8-0 decision, the Court upholds the Florida Supreme Court decision in *Chandler v Florida;* the Florida court ruled that the constitutional rights of 2 defendants were not violated by the televising of their trial; the court did not rule on the news media's right to broadcast a trial.

Terrorism

Jan. 12—A Puerto Rican terrorist group, the Macheteros, claims responsibility for time bombs that destroyed 9 military jet fighters at Mũniz Air National Guard Base at Isla Verde, Puerto Rico; damage is estimated at $45 million.

ZAMBIA

Jan. 20—Copper miners go on strike after a decision by the United National Independence party to expel 17 union leaders for their opposition to a new program of local government.

ZIMBABWE

Jan. 3—The government announces its purchase of the South African Argus newspaper chain's controlling interest in Zimbabwe's major newspapers.

Jan. 5—Home Affairs Minister Joshua Nkomo criticizes the government for taking over the press.

Jan. 10—Prime Minister Robert Mugabe removes Nkomo from his Cabinet post of Home Affairs, which gave him control of the national police; Nkomo refuses to become Minister of Public Service.

Mugabe dismisses Minister of Manpower Planning Edgar Tekere.

Jan. 27—Mugabe appoints Nkomo as Minister without Portfolio; Nkomo will retain his Cabinet seat and will be responsible for public security. ■


Nations of Africa
Atlantic Ocean
Atlantic Ocean
Indian Ocean
U. S. S. R.
NORWAY
SWEDEN
N. IRELAND
IRELAND
UNITED KINGDOM
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POLAND
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ITALY
PORT.
SPAIN
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
TURKEY
Mediterranean Sea
CYPRUS
SYRIA
LEB.
ISRAEL
IRAQ
IRAN
JORDAN
KUWAIT
OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL
SUEZ CANAL
SAUDI ARABIA
N. YEMEN
S. YEMEN
Red Sea
MADEIRA IS. (PORT.)
CANARY IS. (SPAIN)
Rabat
MOROCCO
Algiers
Tunis
TUNISIA
Tripoli
Bengasi
WESTERN SAHARA
ALGERIA
LIBYA
Cairo
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
Lake Nasser
Nile R.
MAURITANIA
SAHARA
MALI
NIGER
CHAD
SUDAN
Khartoum
ERITREA
DJIBOUTI
Addis Ababa
ETHIOPIA
OGADEN
SOMALIA
Mogadishu
SENEGAL
GUINEA
Bamako
UPPER VOLTA
Ouagadougou
Niamey
Lake Chad
N'Djamena
IVORY COAST
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA
Monrovia
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BENIN
NIGERIA
Lagos
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Accra
Lome
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Yaounde
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Bangui
EQUAT. GUINEA
Libreville
SAO TOMÉ AND PRINCIPE
GABON
CONGO REP.
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
CABINDA
EQUATOR
0°
0°
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Kampala
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Kigali
ZAIRE REPUBLIC
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L. Victoria
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Windhoek
BOTSWANA
Gaberones
Pretoria
Maputo
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Maseru
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